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Abstract	  
	  This	   paper	   examines	   international	   reactions	   to	   Scotland’s	   2014	   bid	   for	  independence	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  socialisation	  of	  an	  aspirant	  state,	  what	  we	  term	  pre-­‐socialisation.	  	  	  Building	  on	  and	  contributing	  to	  research	  on	  state	  socialization	  and	   role	   theory,	   this	   study	   proposes	   a	   nexus	   between	   roles	   and	   sovereignty.	  	  This	  nexus	  has	   three	  components	  –	  sovereignty	   itself	   is	  a	   role	  casted	   for	  by	  an	  actor,	   the	   sovereign	   role	   is	   entangled	  with	   substantive	   foreign	  policy	   roles	   the	  actor	  might	  play,	  and	  the	  sovereign	  role	  implicates	  the	  substantive	  foreign	  policy	  roles	  of	  other	  actors.	  The	  Scottish	  debate	  on	  independence	  provides	  an	  effective	  laboratory	   to	   develop	   and	   explore	   these	   theoretical	   dimensions	   of	   pre-­‐socialization,	   revealing	   the	   contested	   value	   and	   meaning	   of	   sovereignty,	   the	  possible	   roles	   an	   independent	   Scotland	   could	   play,	   and	   the	   projected	  implications	  for	  the	  role	  of	  the	  UK	  and	  other	  international	  actors.	  	  Our	  analysis	  of	  the	  Scottish	  case	  can	  provide	  insights	  for	  other	  cases	  of	  pre-­‐socialisation	  and	  is	  more	  empirically	  significant	  following	  the	  UK’s	  2016	  referendum	  to	  leave	  the	  EU.	  	  
Keywords	  socialisation,	  role	  theory,	  sovereignty,	  Scottish	  independence,	  United	  Kingdom	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Introduction	  In	   October	   2012,	   Scottish	   First	   Minister	   Alex	   Salmond	   and	   UK	   Prime	  Minister	  David	  Cameron	  signed	  the	  Edinburgh	  Agreement,	  allowing	  Scotland	  to	  hold	  an	  independence	  referendum.	  	  The	  ensuing	  debate	  centred	  around	  the	  ‘Yes’	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side,	  mainly	  the	  Scottish	  National	  Party	  (in	  power	  in	  the	  Scottish	  executive	  since	  2007)	   versus	   the	   ‘No’	   side	   (later	   changed	   to	   ‘No,	   thanks,’),	   mainly	   the	   Better	  Together	   campaign	   (an	   umbrella	   organisation).	   Although	   this	   matter	   was	   for	  eligible	  voters	  of	  Scotland	  to	  decide,	  external	  actors	  also	  weighed	  in,	  contesting	  Scotland’s	   potential	   roles	   as	   a	   sovereign	   state.	   We	   argue	   that	   the	   case	  demonstrates	  a	  crucial	  interplay	  between	  sovereignty	  and	  roles.	  	  This	  is	  the	  first	  theoretically-­‐focused	   empirical	   analysis	   of	   the	   international	   dimension	   of	   the	  Scottish	  referendum.	  We	   focus	   on	   the	   period	   when	   the	   international	   community	   became	  interested	   in	   the	   question	   of	   an	   independent	   Scotland	   (from	   2012	   to	   the	   18	  September	  2014	  vote).1	  Previous	  moves	  increasing	  Scottish	  autonomy	  (including	  the	   1997	   referendum	   that	   endorsed	   devolution)	   did	   not	   attract	   much	  international	   attention,	   but	   the	   political	   transition	   from	   seeking	   devolution	   to	  seeking	  independence	  highlighted	  for	  international	  actors	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  case	  (Walker,	  2014).	  A	  new	  Scottish	  state	  would	  have	  significant	  implications	  for	  international	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  EU	  and	  NATO,	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  UK,	  and	  other	   independence	   movements.	   	   Although	   the	   ‘Yes’	   side	   failed	   to	   achieve	   its	  independence	   bid,	   the	   case	   is	   more	   salient	   following	   the	   2016	   British	  referendum	   to	   leave	   the	   European	   Union	   (Brexit)	   vote,	   in	   which	   English	   and	  Welsh	  majorities	   favored	   a	   departure	  while	   a	   substantial	  majority	   in	   Scotland	  voted	  to	  remain	  (BBC	  News	  2016a),	  reigniting	  independence	  discussions.	  	  	  We	  use	  the	  Scottish	  case	  to	  develop	  a	  conception	  of	  socialisation	  prior	  to	  statehood	   –	   what	   we	   term	   pre-­‐socialisation	   –	   which	   involves	   a	   fundamental	  interplay	   between	   international	   conceptions	   of	   sovereignty	   and	   foreign	   policy	  roles.	   	   This	   sovereignty-­‐role	   nexus	   manifests	   itself	   in	   the	   pre-­‐statehood	   period	  through	   role	   forecasting,	   where	   actors	   contest	   the	   nature	   and	   value	   of	  sovereignty	   through	   the	   role	   transformations	   that	   could	   hypothetically	   be	  produced	   in	   the	   event	   of	   statehood.	   	   This	   symbolic-­‐interactionist	   account	   of	  international	   state	   formation	   advances	   our	   understanding	   of	   both	   role	   theory	  and	   state	   socialisation	   by	   viewing	   roles	   as	   constructed	   repositories	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  long	  history	  of	  Scottish-­‐English	  relations,	  from	  10th	  century	  border	  wars	  to	  the	   election	   of	   the	   first	   modern	   Scottish	   parliament	   with	   devolved	   powers	   in	  1999	  undoubtedly	  affected	  the	  referendum	  debate,	  but	  is	  beyond	  our	  focus	  here.	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sovereignty	  within	  international	  society.	  The	  Scottish	  case	  in	  particular	  isolates	  this	   by	   bracketing	   other	   factors	   often	   associated	   with	   the	   establishment	   of	  statehood;	   there	   was	   no	   rejection	   of	   international	   norms,	   no	  military	   conflict,	  and	  the	  bid	  for	  independence	  was	  accepted	  by	  the	  home	  state.	  This	  analysis	  not	  only	   helps	   us	   understand	   the	   Scottish	   independence	   referendum,	   but	   also	   has	  broader	   applicability	   to	   other	   independence	   movements,	   as	   well	   as	   role	  transformations	  related	  to	  sovereignty.	  	  	  	  
Theoretical	  foundations	  of	  state	  socialisation	  State	   socialisation	   is	   an	   important	   process	   in	   international	   relations,	  affecting	   ‘the	   formation	  and	  change	  of	  preferences;	  national	   identity	   formation;	  the	   creation,	   diffusion	   of,	   and	   compliance	   with	   international	   norms;	   and	   the	  effects	   of	   international	   institutions’	   (Johnston	   2001:489).	   Socialisation	   is	  referenced	   in	   a	   wide-­‐ranging	   set	   of	   IR	   theories.	   	   Neorealism,	   for	   example,	  includes	  socialisation	  as	  processes	  of	  selection	  and	  competition	  in	  which	  anarchy	  moulds	  states	  into	  like	  units	  (e.g.	  Waltz	  1979;	  for	  discussion	  see	  Alderson	  2001;	  Checkel	  2005;	  Thies	  2010b).	  Socialisation	  as	  norm	  internalization	  or	  adaptation	  is	   also	   an	   important	   part	   of	   liberal-­‐oriented	   perspectives,	   including	   regime	  theory,	  international	  legal	  approaches,	  and	  rationalist	  institutionalism	  (Alderson	  2001;	   Schimmelfennig	   2000).	   English	   School	   perspectives	   include	   socialisation	  as	   the	  process	  by	  which	   the	   international	   society	   generates	   common	   interests,	  values,	   and	   rules	   (Cantir	   2011;	   Checkel	   2005;	   Schimmelfennig	   2000).	   For	  constructivists	  like	  Wendt,	  socialisation	  is	  ‘a	  ubiquitous	  feature	  of	  interaction	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  all	  identities	  and	  interests	  get	  produced	  and	  reproduced’	  (Wendt	  1992:	  403	  fn	  42;	  see	  also	  Schimmelfennig	  2000).	  	  Despite	   the	   importance	   of	   socialisation	   in	   IR	   theories,	   there	   are	   two	  significant	   limitations	   to	   this	   research.	   	   First,	  most	   of	   these	   studies	   use	   norm-­‐based	   definitions	   of	   socialisation	   (exceptions	   include	   Cantir	   2011;	  Schimmelfennig	   2000).	   Second,	   socialisation	   theories	   have	   almost	   exclusively	  assumed	   the	   existence	   of	   states	   as	   their	   starting	   point.	   Once	   states	   come	   into	  existence,	   theorists	   differ	   with	   regard	   to	   how	   they	   are	   socialised	   into	   the	  international	  order,	  but	  socialisation	  efforts	  prior	  to	  statehood	  –pre-­‐socialisation	  –	   are	   not	   specified.	   This	   leaves	   important	   factors	   unexamined,	   such	   as	   the	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relationship	   of	   sovereignty	   to	   socialisation	   and	   the	   process	   of	   constructing	  agency	  prior	  to	  membership	   in	   international	  society.	  Departing	  from	  normative	  approaches	  by	  using	  Thies’s	  argument	  that	  socialisation	  can	  be	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  process	  of	   role	   location,	  we	  extend	   this	  approach	  by	  developing	  expectations	  about	  the	  key	  features	  of	  pre-­‐socialisation.	  	  	  
Socialisation:	  norms	  and	  roles	  In	   the	   influential	   special	   issue	   on	   socialisation	   in	   International	  
Organization,	  Checkel	  (2005:	  804)	  defines	  socialisation	  as	  ‘a	  process	  of	  inducting	  actors	  into	  the	  norms	  and	  rules	  of	  a	  given	  community.	  	  Its	  outcome	  is	  sustained	  compliance	   based	   on	   the	   internalization	   of	   these	   new	   norms.’	   This	   definition	  reflects	  what	  Johnston	  calls	  a	  general	  agreement	  across	  the	  social	  sciences	  that	  socialisation	   is	   ‘social	   interaction	   that	   leads	  novices	   to	  endorse	  “expected	  ways	  of	   thinking,	   feeling,	   and	   acting’’’	   (Johnston	   2001:	   494;	   citing	   Stryker	   and	  Stratham	   1985:325).	   English-­‐school	   inspired	   research	   also	   conceptualises	  socialisation	   as	   a	   process	   resulting	   in	   conformity	   to	   societal	   conventions	  (Armstrong	   1993:7-­‐8).	   Constructivist	   research	   embraces	   socialisation	   as	   norm	  internalisation,	   examining	   different	   mechanisms	   and	   effectiveness	   of	  socialisation	   efforts,	   particularly	   in	   highly	   institutional	   contexts	   (e.g.,	   Checkel	  2005;	  Flockhart	  2004).	  Conceptualising	  socialisation	  as	  norm	  internalisation	  is	  problematic	  as	  it	  presents	  too	  limited	  a	  vision,	  first	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  socialisation	  to	  fail	   and	   second	  with	   regard	   to	  neglect	  of	  non-­‐normative	  aspects.	   	  According	   to	  Thies	   (2003:	   544),	   ‘the	   focus	   on	   internalisation	   is	   common	   in	   current	  international	   relations	   thinking	   about	   socialisation,	   but…defining	   socialisation	  by	  the	  degree	  of	  internalisation	  has	  generally	  been	  discarded	  in	  sociology.’	  This	  is	   because	   actors	   may	   simply	   adapt	   their	   behaviour	   to	   comply	   with	   others’	  expectations,	   but	   not	   internalise	   norms.	   	   Actors	   may	   also	   completely	   reject	  socialisation	   efforts,	   even	   if	   there	   are	   high	   subsequent	   costs.	   	   Defining	  socialisation	  more	  broadly,	  as	  ‘activity	  that	  confronts	  and	  lends	  structure	  to	  the	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entry	  of	  non-­‐members	   into	   an	   already	  existing	  world’	   (Wentworth	  1985:5)2	  or	  society	   -­‐-­‐	   is	   more	   inclusive,	   and	   allows	   socialisation	   to	   fall	   short	   of	  internalisation.	  	  	  Thies	  also	  argues	   that	  socialisation	  could	   involve	  norms,	   ‘but	  might	  also	  include	  roles,	  beliefs,	  principles,	  or	  rules’	  (2003:	  545).3	  Thies	  advances	  roles	  as	  a	  fruitful	  concept	  to	  capture	  socialisation	  since	  roles	  are	  ‘repertoires	  of	  behaviour,	  inferred	   from	  others’	  expectations	  and	  one’s	  own	  conceptions,	  selected	  at	   least	  partly	  in	  response	  to	  cues	  and	  demands’	  (Walker	  1992:	  23)	  and	  represent	  social	  positions	  within	  groups	  of	  actors	   (Thies	  2003).	  States,	   for	  example,	  may	  play	  a	  variety	   of	   roles,	   such	   as	   ‘faithful	   ally,’	   ‘great	   power’,	   or	   ‘bridge’	   (Holsti	   1970).	  	  Socialisation,	  then,	  can	  involve	  processes	  by	  which	  existing	  members	  shape	  roles	  available	  to	  new	  members.	  	  Thies	  argues	  that	  ‘the	  use	  of	  roles	  allows	  us	  to	  draw	  on	   a	   variety	   of	   established	   social	   psychological	   theories…and	   a	   variety	   of	   role	  theories,	   all	   of	   which	   have	   well-­‐developed	   views	   on	   socialisation’	   (2003:545)	  and	   that	   ‘role	   theory’s	   articulated	   views	   on	   the	   socialization	   process	   stand	   in	  stark	   contrast	   to	   the	   underdeveloped	   models	   of	   socialization	   associated	   with	  norms’	   (2010b:	   696).4	  This	   broader	   perspective	   also	   provides	   opportunities	   to	  examine	   cases	   of	   socialisation	  where	   norms	   are	   largely	   uncontested	   (as	   in	   the	  Scottish	  case),	  yet	  states	  are	  nevertheless	  being	  socialised.	  	  	   	  
Socialisation:	  	  a	  role	  theoretic	  perspective	  A	   role	   theoretic	   analysis	   of	   pre-­‐socialisation	   allows	   us	   to	   draw	   on	   and	  contribute	   to	   role	   theory	   research,	  which	  has	  blossomed	   in	   recent	   years.5	  Role	  theory	   is	   exceptionally	   rich	   conceptually,	   theoretically	   and	   ontologically,	  integrating	   several	   concepts	   (e.g.	   beliefs,	   identities,	   material	   and	   normative	  structures,	   interaction,	  agency,	  behaviour)	   important	   for	  understanding	   foreign	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2As	  quoted	  in	  Thies	  2010b.	  3	  Italics	  in	  original.	  4	  For	  convenience	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  customary	  use,	  we	  adopt	  the	  terms	  “role	  theory”	  even	  though	  we	  agree	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  theory	  per	  se,	  but	  more	  a	  theoretical	  framework.	  5	  Recent	   efforts	   include	   Harnisch,	   Frank,	   and	   Maull	   (2011),	   a	   special	   issue	   of	  
Foreign	   Policy	   Analysis	   edited	   by	   Thies	   and	   Breuning	   (2012),	   and	   Harnisch,	  Bersick,	  and	  Gottwald	  (2016).	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policy	   and	   international	   relations. 6 	  It	   provides	   a	   conceptual	   tool-­‐kit	   for	  understanding	   complex	   social	   processes,	   and	   operates	   at	   multiple	   levels	   of	  analysis,	  bridging	  agents	  and	  structures;	  several	  scholars	  have	  noted	  this	  as	  one	  of	   its	   distinct	   advantages	   (e.g.,	   Barnett	   1993;	   Thies	   2010b;	   Harnisch	   2011;	  Breuning	  2011).	  Rooted	   in	   symbolic	   interactionism,	   role	   theory	   includes	   socialisation	  processes	  and	  differs	  from	  a	  structural-­‐functionalist	  perspective	  in	  which	  ‘roles	  are	  sets	  of	  rights	  and	  duties	  attached	  to	  particular	  social	  positions’	  and	  emerge	  from	  interactions’	  (McCourt	  2012:	  376).	  	  Roles	  are	  created	  through	  a	  process	  of	  Ego	  (the	  role-­‐seeking	  state)	  interacting	  with	  Alters	  (others)	  and	  are	  not	  fixed	  or	  pre-­‐determined,	  but	  conditional	  on	  Alters’	  acceptance	  (Aggestam	  2006;	  Harnisch	  2011;	   McCourt	   2012;	   Wehner	   and	   Thies	   2014;	   Beneš	   and	   Harnisch	   2015).	  According	   to	   Wehner	   (2014:4),	   ‘a	   symbolic-­‐interactionist	   approach	   brings…to	  the	   fore	   the	   social	   nature	   of	   the	   structure,	   the	   nonreification	   of	   it,	   and	   the	  importance	  of	  the	  actors’	  agency	  capacity	  to	  cast	  and	  change	  roles	  based	  on	  the	  interaction’	  of	  Ego	  and	  Alters.	  From	  a	  role	  theory	  perspective	  this	  interaction,	  or	  role	  location	  process,	  is	  socialisation.	  	  That	  is,	  states	  locate	  roles	  through	  interactive	  socialisation	  	  ‘where	  role	  expectations	  of	   the	  self	  and	  other,	   role	  demands	  of	   the	  situation,	  and	  cues	  from	  the	  audience	  all	  come	  together	  to	  produce	  a	  role	  for	  the	  actor	  and	  set	  the	  conditions	  for	  its	  appropriate	  enactment'	  (Thies	  2013:35).	  	  Socialisation	  ‘focuses	  on	   the	   role	   taking	  of	  an	  actor	   in	  an	  existing	   social	   structure’	   (Harnisch	  2016).7	  	  Thies’s	   (2012)	   compelling	   study	   on	   the	   ‘novice’	   state,	   for	   example,	   analyses	  Israel	   and	   the	   United	   States	   in	   early	   statehood.	   	   He	   shows	   the	   interactions	  through	   which	   ‘novices’	   are	   socialised	   and	   demonstrates	   the	   challenges	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  A	   full	   review	   of	   role	   theory	   research	   in	   international	   relations	   is	   beyond	   our	  scope.	  	  Seminal	  works	  include	  Holsti	  1970;	  Wish	  1980;	  Walker	  1987.	  	  For	  recent	  overviews,	   see,	   Thies	   2010a;	  Harnisch	   2011;	   Breuning	   2011;	   and	  Wehner	   and	  Thies	  2014.	  7	  Role	  theory’s	  concept	  of	  ‘alter-­‐casting’	  is	  related	  to	  socialisation	  as	  both	  involve	  others’	  reactions	  and	  role	  expectations.	  	  Harnisch	  (2016),	  however,	  argues	  alter-­‐casting	  is	  different	  in	  that	  it	  involves	  Alters	  changing	  their	  own	  role	  to	  structure	  the	  possible	  roles	  of	  Ego	  (see	  also	  Thies	  2016).	  	  In	  pre-­‐socialisation,	  these	  roles	  are	  hypothetical,	  yet	  to	  be	  enacted.	  	  We	  suggest	  that	  the	  more	  general	  concept	  of	  socialisation	  in	  which	  Alters	  signal	  their	  preferences	  for	  Ego’s	  future	  roles	  better	  captures	  the	  dynamics	  of	  pre-­‐socialisation.	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newcomers	   to	   the	   international	  society.	   	  While	  his	  examination	   is	   thorough,	  he	  offers	  no	  justification	  for	  beginning	  his	  analysis	  after	  statehood.	  	  The	  focus	  on	  the	  ‘novice’	  state	  begs	  the	  question:	  	  how	  are	  actors	  socialised	  prior	  to	  statehood?	  Role	   theory	   research,	   like	   most	   socialisation	   work	   within	   International	  Relations,	   assumes	   sovereign	   states	   as	   a	   starting	   point	   (Coggins	   2011).	  Wendt	  (1992),	   for	   example,	   allows	   anarchy	   and	   the	   international	   system	   to	   be	  constructed	  by	   states,	   but	   does	   not	   specify	   how	   Ego	   and	   Alter	   themselves	   are	  socially	   constructed	   as	   states.	   Presumably,	   however,	   agents	   are	   constructed	  prior	   to	   statehood,	   as	   societies	  do	  not	  only	   admit	   and	   then	   socialise	  members,	  but	   also	   form	  members	   from	   existing	   actors.	   	   With	   its	   symbolic-­‐interactionist	  perspective	  role	  theory	  is	  especially	  suited	  to	  examine	  the	  pre-­‐state	  processes	  of	  socialisation	  as	  states	  make	  and	  re-­‐make	  one	  another	  in	  a	  continuous	  process	  of	  interpretation	   and	   construction	   of	   meaning	   and	   identity.	   	   In	   the	   modern	  international	  system	  new	  states	  have	  typically	  formed	  by	  reformulating	  existing	  states	   (Fabry	   2010;	   Coggins	   2011).	   	   Thus	   socialisation	   can	   conceivably	   apply	  before	   a	   new	   state	   is	   formally	   recognised	   as	   such.	   	   From	   this	   point	   of	   view,	   if	  anarchy	   is	   what	   states	   make	   of	   it,	   pre-­‐socialisation	   is	   what	   makes	   sovereign	  states.	  	  
Pre-­‐Socialisation:	  	  The	  Sovereignty-­‐Role	  Nexus	  The	  key	   factor	  distinguishing	   socialisation	  before	   and	   after	   statehood	   is	  sovereignty.	   	   We	   propose	   a	   ‘sovereignty-­‐role	   nexus’	   is	   central	   to	   the	   pre-­‐socialisation	   process,	   which	   is	   comprised	   of	   three	   aspects.	   	   First,	   as	   Barnett	  (1993)	  and	  Thies	  (2013)	  have	  demonstrated,	  sovereignty	  itself	  can	  be	  treated	  as	  a	   type	   of	   role.	   	   Second,	   we	   argue	   that	   in	   pre-­‐socialisation	   this	   sovereign	   role	  becomes	   interconnected	   with	   substantive	   foreign	   policy	   roles	   an	   actor	   might	  play	  if	  it	  becomes	  sovereign.	  	  Third,	  given	  the	  social	  system	  of	  states,	  we	  propose	  that	  the	  potential	  sovereign	  role	  becomes	  entangled	  with	  the	  substantive	  foreign	  policy	   roles	   that	   other	   actors	   play.	   	   All	   three	   aspects	   of	   the	   sovereignty-­‐role	  nexus	   affect	   pre-­‐socialisation.	   	   After	   developing	   these	   theoretical	   propositions,	  we	  use	   the	  Scottish	  case	   to	   illustrate	   the	  connections	  between	  sovereignty	  and	  roles	  during	  the	  independence	  referendum.	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Role	   theory	   brings	   our	   attention	   to	   the	   relational	   and	   interactive	  dimensions	  of	  sovereignty.	  	  From	  a	  symbolic	  interaction	  perspective,	  sovereignty	  is	  not	  an	  ability	  or	  capacity	   that	   is	  necessary	   to	  enable	  agency	  and	  enact	   roles,	  but	   is	   a	   consequence	   of	   defining	   agency	   itself.	   	   That	   is,	   sovereignty	   is	   not	   a	  structural-­‐functionalist	  ‘status’	  that	  is	  conferred	  on	  an	  aspirant	  state	  based	  on	  its	  ascribed	   characteristics,	   but	   instead	   arises	   from	   the	   social	   interaction	   process	  wherein	  the	  possibility	  and	  appropriateness	  of	  sovereignty	  can	  be	  debated	  and	  contested.	   We	   suggest	   that	   during	   pre-­‐statehood	   these	   processes	   actually	  construct	  the	  ‘sovereign	  role’	  and	  this	  role	  becomes	  part	  of	  the	  repertoire	  of	  pre-­‐socialisation,	   effectively	   giving	  Alters	   a	   foundational	  way	   to	   support	   or	  oppose	  role	   enactment	   sought	   by	   an	   aspirant	   state.	   International	   debate	   over	  independence	  is	  not	  confined	  to	  the	  type	  of	  foreign	  policy	  role	  (discussed	  below)	  the	  state	  might	  or	  might	  not	  play,	  but	  also	  includes	  the	  desirability	  and	  feasibility	  of	  an	  actor	  taking	  on	  the	  role	  of	  sovereign	  state.	  Pre-­‐socialisation	  takes	  the	  form	  of	   instructing	   a	   potential	   state	   about	   the	   nature,	   value,	   and	   meaning	   of	   the	  sovereignty	  it	  seeks.	  In	  this	  way,	  sovereignty	  itself	  is	  a	  role	  within	  the	  society	  of	  states,	  which	  Ego	  can	  seek	   to	  enact	  and	  Alter(s)	  can	  seek	   to	  accept,	   reject,	   and	  shape	   just	   as	   with	   other	   roles.	   This	   is	   the	   first	   aspect	   of	   the	   sovereignty-­‐role	  nexus.	  The	   sovereign	   role	   will	   be	   significantly	   affected	   by	   the	   meaning	   of	  sovereignty	  within	  the	  international	  system.	  	  As	  Philpott	  (1995)	  argues,	  ‘we	  can	  read	   the	   essential	   character	   of	   any	   era	   in	   international	   relations	   through	   its	  norms	   of	   sovereignty’	   (p.360)	   which	   function	   at	   the	   international	   level	   and	  provide	  answers	  to	  three	  questions:	  what	  are	  the	  legitimate	  polities	  (e.g.	  states),	  who	  can	  become	  one,	  and	  what	  powers	  does	  sovereignty	  confer?	  	  Philpott	  claims	  there	   have	   been	   several	   revolutions	   in	   sovereignty	   since	   the	   Treaty	   of	  Westphalia	   that	   have	   transformed	   the	   norms	   of	   sovereignty,	   resulting	   in	  different	  legitimate	  polities,	  actors,	  and	  powers.	  	  	  Pre-­‐socialisation	  reflects	  these	  conceptions	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  the	  value	  and	  applicability	  of	  a	  sovereign	  role	  for	  the	  aspirant	  state.	  	  	  	  We	   propose	   that	   these	   different	   conceptions	   of	   sovereignty	   shape	   the	  roles	   available	   within	   the	   international	   system.	   	   Indeed,	   all	   roles	   imply	  something	  about	  sovereignty,	  and	  some	  roles,	  including	  some	  in	  Holsti’s	  (1970)	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original	   inventory	   of	   roles,	   are	   defined	   largely	   along	   sovereignty	   lines	   (e.g.	  ‘independent’,	  ‘colony’),	  rather	  than	  primarily	  on	  capabilities	  (e.g.	  ‘great	  power’)	  or	   character	   (e.g.	   ‘mediator,’	   ‘faithful	   ally’).	   	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   sovereignty-­‐role	  nexus	  links	  prevailing	  conceptions	  of	  sovereignty,	  and	  the	  sovereign	  role,	  to	  the	  substantive	  types	  of	  roles	  available	  within	  the	  international	  society.	   	  This	  is	  the	  second	  key	  aspect	  of	  the	  sovereignty-­‐role	  nexus.	  	  The	  early	  Cold	  War	  period,	  for	  example,	  saw	  ‘great	  power’	  roles,	  ‘faithful	  allies’,	  and	  ‘dependents’.	   	  According	  to	  Philpott,	  however,	  the	  subsequent	  era	  of	  colonial	  independence	  saw	  a	  change	  in	  conceptions	  of	  sovereignty.	  	  States	  were	  retained	   as	   the	   polities	   with	   similar	   powers,	   but	   new	   norms	   allowed	   former	  colonies	   to	   become	   sovereign.	   	   This	   period	   of	   decolonisation,	   where	   norms	   of	  sovereignty	   were	   extended	   to	   former	   colonies	   as	   legitimate	   actors,	   arguably	  helped	   create	   a	   new	   set	   of	   roles	   premised	   on	  maintaining	   and	   extending	   that	  sovereignty	   (‘independent’;	   ‘non-­‐aligned’;	   see	   Wish	   1980;	   Walker	   1987).	  European	  integration,	  Philpott	  (2001)	  argues,	  has	  more	  recently	  challenged	  the	  widespread	   acceptance	   of	   the	   sovereign	   state	   system.	   The	   EU	   transformed	   all	  three	  aspects	  of	  sovereignty,	  allowing	  its	  institutions	  to	  pool	  states’	  sovereignty,	  setting	   up	   criteria	   for	   membership,	   and	   altering	   the	   legitimate	   powers	   of	  individual	   states.	   Within	   the	   European	   theatre,	   this	   transformation	   in	  sovereignty	  around	   the	   integration	  of	   the	  EU	  made	  new	  roles	  possible,	   such	  as	  ‘civilian	   power’	   (Duchêne 1972; Maull	   1990)	   and	   ‘normative	   power	   Europe’	  (Manners	  2002).	  	  Thus,	  an	  extant	   society	  of	   states	  constructs	   the	   role	  of	  a	   sovereign	  state	  toward	   which	   potential	   states	   must	   aspire,	   and	   different	   substantive	   roles	  become	  possible	   for	  new	  states	   to	   seek	  depending	  on	  how	  sovereignty	   itself	   is	  constructed.	   Of	   course	   roles	   are	   also	   defined	   by	   material	   resources,	   culture,	  norms,	   and	   leaders’	   beliefs	   (e.g.,	  Wish	   1980;	   Aggestam	   2004;	   Breuning	   2011),	  but	  we	  argue	  that	  prevailing	  notions	  of	  sovereignty	  are	  central	  to	  roles.	  	  In	  pre-­‐socialisation,	  the	  connection	  between	  sovereignty	  and	  substantive	  roles	  is	  most	  evident:	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  actor	  should	  become	  sovereign	  is	  bound	  up	  in	  what	  type	  of	  role	  it	  would	  play,	  and	  what	  roles	  it	  can	  play	  are	  shaped	  by	  the	  prevailing	  conceptions	  of	  sovereignty.	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Thus	   pre-­‐socialisation	   efforts	   must	   by	   necessity	   work	   along	   a	  sovereignty-­‐role	  nexus	  where	  the	  taking	  of	  a	  sovereign	  role	  and	  the	  taking	  of	  a	  substantive	   role	   are	   simultaneously	   engaged.	   The	   substantive	   role	   that	   a	   new	  actor	   would	   take	   is	   not	   fully	   known-­‐-­‐it	   is	   hypothetical:	   	   if	   the	   actor	   becomes	  sovereign,	  then	  it	  might	  or	  might	  not	  play	  certain	  roles.	  Thus,	  forecasting	  in	  pre-­‐socialisation	  not	  only	  involves	  questions	  about	  whether	  an	  aspirant	  state	  should	  be	  sovereign,	  but	  also	  what	  kind	  of	  roles	  it	  should	  take.	  	  The	   third	   way	   in	   which	   sovereignty	   and	   roles	   are	   connected	   in	   pre-­‐socialisation	  follows	  from	  role	  theory’s	  conception	  of	  roles	  interacting	  in	  a	  social	  system.	   	   As	   roles	   are	   relational,	   a	   new	   state	   gaining	   sovereignty	   and	   enacting	  new	  roles	  may	  transform	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  home	  state	  from	  which	  independence	  would	  be	  achieved,	  and	  this	  may	  have	  significant	  consequences	  for	  others.	  While	  all	   roles	   are	   interdependent,	   role	   entanglement	   in	   a	   bid	   for	   sovereignty	   is	   of	   a	  special	  nature,	  as	  it	  arises	  between	  the	  aspiring	  state	  and	  the	  home	  state	  because	  
of	  the	  sovereignty	  question.	  	  Thus	  the	  co-­‐constitutive	  nature	  of	  roles	  prompts,	  in	  the	  pre-­‐socialisation	  period,	  questions	  about	  how	  the	  home	  state	  would	  change	  and	   what	   benefits	   would	   be	   possible	   or	   foregone	   if	   it	   can	   no	   longer	   play	   its	  substantive	   foreign	   policy	   roles.	   	   Others	   in	   the	   role	   system	   may	   have	  considerable	   interests	   in	   the	   home	   state’s	   role(s)	   and	  may	   oppose	   or	   support	  independence	   based	   on	   the	   hypothetical	   forecasting	   of	   the	   home	   state’s	   role.	  	  Thus,	  pre-­‐socialisation	  efforts	  may	  involve	  as	  much	  about	  the	  home	  state	  as	  they	  do	  about	  the	  aspirant	  state.	  	   An	  aspirant	   state’s	   sovereign	  role	  may	  be	  concerning	   to	  other	  states	   for	  reasons	  beyond	  the	  direct	  effect	  on	  the	  home	  state.	  	  Sovereignty	  is	  clearly	  valued	  by	  all	  who	  have	  or	  seek	  it,	  but	  others	  may	  seek	  to	  ration	  and	  regulate	  sovereignty	  to	   maintain	   the	   status	   quo	   (Fabry	   2010).	   	   States	   vulnerable	   to	   secession	  themselves	  may	  worry	  about	  precedents	  for	  secession	  and	  the	  consequences	  to	  their	  own	  sovereignty	  and	  indeed	  their	  own	  roles	  in	  the	  world	  (Saideman	  1997;	  Coggins	  2011).	  	  Others	  may	  oppose	  secession	  not	  out	  of	  concern	  for	  direct	  effects	  on	   themselves,	   but	   because	   independence	   challenges	   prevailing	   norms	   of	  sovereignty	   and	   conceptions	   of	   the	   sovereign	   role	   (Philpott	   1995).	   	   This	   is	  related	   to	   the	   first	  aspect	  of	   the	   sovereignty-­‐role	  nexus,	  but	  differs.	   In	   the	   first	  aspect,	  the	  value	  of	  sovereignty	  is	  questioned	  for	  the	  aspirant	  state.	  	  In	  this	  third	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aspect,	  others’	  reactions	  to	  independence	  are	  motivated	  by	  the	  consequences	  of	  independence	  for	  the	  prevailing	  norms	  of	  sovereignty.	   	  Others’	  positions	  on	  the	  sovereign	  role	  of	  an	  aspirant	  state	  may	  stem	  from	  broader	  concerns	  about	  effects	  on	   the	   sovereign	   system.	   From	   an	   English	   School	   perspective,	   gatekeepers	  oppose	  new	  states	  to	  maintain	  the	  current	  system	  of	  rules	  and	  norms	  (e.g.,	  Bull	  1977;	  Wight	   1977;	   Armstrong	   1993).	   	   Here,	   however,	   gatekeepers	   also	  worry	  about	  the	  consequences	  a	  new	  sovereign	  state	  might	  have	  for	  others’	  roles,	  role	  conflicts,	  and	  a	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  sovereign	  system.	  	  	  In	  sum,	  pre-­‐socialisation	  reveals	   three	   interrelated	  connections	  between	  sovereignty	  and	  roles	  –	  sovereignty	  as	  a	  role	  itself,	  sovereignty	  and	  substantive	  foreign	  policy	  roles,	  and	  the	  sovereign	  role’s	  consequences	  for	  others’	  roles	  and	  the	  international	  community.	  	  Our	  approach	  has	  obvious	  links	  to	  research	  on	  the	  social	   construction	   of	   sovereignty	   (e.g.,	   Barnett	   1993;	   Biersteker	   and	   Weber	  1996),	   on	   state	   formation,	   particularly	   social-­‐constituitive	   perspectives	   on	  recognition	   (e.g.,	   Fabry	   2010;	   Coggins	   2011)	   and	   on	   changes	   in	   international	  society	  and	  the	  sovereign	  state	  system	  (e.g.,	  Wight	  1977;	  Jackson	  2000).	  Our	  role	  theory	   approach	   to	   socialisation,	   however,	   does	   not	   solely	   focus	   on	  when	   and	  why	  other	   states	   formally	   recognize	   independently	  declared	   territories,	  nor	  on	  notions	  of	   international	   legitimacy	  about	  the	  rightful	  membership	  of	   the	   family	  of	  nations.	  	  A	  role	  theory	  approach	  to	  sovereignty	  adds	  a	  behavioural	  component	  that	  is	   missing	   in	   other	   perspectives	   on	   new	   states.	   	   A	   sovereign	   role	   is	   not	   only	  socially	  constructed	  but	  also	  comes	  with	  expectations	  of	  how	  states	  would	  play	  the	  sovereign	  role.	  	  While	  ‘norms	  of	  sovereignty’	  may	  be	  foundational	  to	  a	  given	  international	   society,	   roles	   add	   to	   this	   the	   repertoire	   of	   behaviours	   that	   a	  sovereign	   actor	   could	   enact.	   As	   such,	   they	   reveal	   the	   pursuits	   to	   which	  sovereignty	  will	  be	  applied.	  	  A	  role	  perspective	  on	  sovereignty	  also	  includes	  the	  behavioural	  implications	  for	  others.	  	  When	  a	  new	  sovereign	  state	  is	  constructed,	  others’	   roles	   may	   have	   to	   change,	   which	   may	   be	   the	   primary	   motivation	   for	  others’	  reactions	  to	  the	  aspirant	  state.	  State	  recognition,	  international	  legitimacy,	  and	   norm	   internalisation	   all	   provide	   insights	   into	   the	   management	   and	  expansion	   of	   international	   society,	   but	   role	   theory	   focuses	   our	   attention	  more	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squarely	  on	   the	   forecasting	  of	  behaviours	   and	   the	   interactive	   construction	  and	  contestation	  of	  sovereignty.	  	  	  	  
Pre-­‐socialisation	  in	  the	  2014	  Scottish	  debate	  on	  independence	  	  The	  Scottish	  case	  is	  well	  situated	  to	  examine	  the	  sovereignty-­‐role	  nexus	  in	  pre-­‐socialisation.	   Although	   often	   unstated,	   the	   focused	   and	   open	   democratic	  nature	  of	  the	  independence	  referendum	  produced	  explicit	  claims	  relating	  to	  role	  taking.	   	   	  The	  Scottish	  case	  may	  be	  rare	  in	  terms	  of	  state	  formation,	  coming	  as	  it	  does	  within	  a	  firmly	  established	  state	  within	  the	  EU,	  with	  the	  reluctant	  blessing	  of	  the	  home	  state	  to	  hold	  a	  binding,	  democratic	  referendum,	  and	  during	  a	  period	  where	  prevailing	  international	  and	  regional	  norms	  strongly	  support	  democracy	  and	   oppose	   military	   force	   in	   violation	   of	   sovereignty.	   	   But	   this	   case	   is	   an	  opportunity	   to	   examine	   pre-­‐socialisation	   where	   important	   norms	   associated	  with	   ‘norm	  internalisation’	  conceptions	  of	  socialisation	  were	  not	   in	  dispute.	  On	  virtually	  all	  major	  international	  and	  foreign	  policy	  issues–-­‐such	  as	  trade,	  defence,	  and	  multilateral	   institutions-­‐-­‐both	   sides	   of	   the	  debate	   embraced	   the	  prevailing	  normative	  international	  and	  regional	  consensus.	  The	  Scottish	  case	  also	   strips	  away	  many	   traditional	   concerns	  around	  an	  independence	  movement,	  leaving	  stark	  the	  question	  of	  sovereignty	  itself.	  	  There	  were	   no	   fears	   of	   internal	   or	   international	   violence,	   no	   regional	   conflict	  implications	  of	  a	  new	  territorial	  unit	  set	  free	  among	  hostile	  neighbours,	  and	  little	  worry	   about	  major	   economic	   shocks	   to	   the	   international	   system.	   	  Given	   this,	   a	  role	   theoretic	   approach	   to	   socialisation	   may	   have	   some	   explanatory	   power	  regarding	   the	   outcome	   of	   this	   important	   case.	   	   Our	   primary	   use	   of	   this	   case,	  however,	   is	   to	   illustrate	   the	   sovereignty-­‐role	   nexus	   developed	   in	   the	   previous	  theoretical	   section.	   	   Drawing	   on	   Walker’s	   (2014)	   analyses	   of	   international	  positions	   on	   the	   referendum,	   states’	   opinions	   expressed	   in	   the	   media,	   and	  statements	  by	  the	  ‘Yes’	  and	  ‘No’	  sides	  in	  Scotland,	  we	  examine	  pro-­‐independence	  actors’	   attempts	   to	   forecast	   both	   a	   sovereign	   role	   and	   specific,	   substantive	  foreign	  policy	   roles	   for	   an	   independent	   Scotland	   (see	   also	  Beasley	   et	   al.	   2016)	  	  We	  also	  examine	  key	  Alters’	   forecasting,	   analyse	  possible	  motivations	   for	   their	  positions,	   and	   discuss	   pro-­‐independence	   Scottish	   reactions	   to	   international	  interventions	  in	  the	  Scottish	  debate.	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The	  international	  interest	  in	  this	  case	  was	  high	  and	  many	  were	  puzzled	  by	  the	  move	  for	  Scottish	  independence,	  asking:	  ‘Why	   was	   part	   of	   the	   Scottish	   populace	   so	   determined	   to	   make	   a	  break	   after	   nearly	   300	   years	   of	   peaceful	   coexistence	   with	   England	  and	  Wales…and	   after	   so	  much	   interdependence	   and	   intermingling?	  	  Why	  was	   there	   a	   desire	   to	   exchange	   the	   comfort	   of	   belonging	   to	   a	  large,	   influential	   state	   for	   a	   small	   state’s	   more	   precarious	   and	  marginal	  existence?’	  (Walker	  2014:749).	  	  	  Despite	   norms	   of	   non-­‐interference	   in	   internal,	   democratic	   affairs,	   key	   external	  actors	  made	  moves	  to	  shape	  the	  internal	  independence	  debate,	  although	  many	  of	  these	  actions	  came	  late,	  close	  to	  the	  vote	  (Walker	  2014).	  This	  hesitancy	  to	  take	  sides	   likely	   stemmed	   from	   the	   widely	   held	   expectation	   that	   the	   referendum	  would	  fail.	  Most	  external	  actors	  expected	  Scottish	  voters	  to	  ‘see	  sense’	  in	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	   analysis	   and	   reject	   independence	   (Walker	   2014)	   and	   public	   opinion	  surveys	  through	  most	  of	   the	  debate	  supported	  this	  expectation.8	  	   	  When,	   in	   the	  spring	   of	   2014,	   opinion	   polls	   indicated	   growing	   support	   for	   independence,	  foreign	   governments	   became	   aware	   ‘that	   the	   hypothetical	   was	   becoming	   less	  hypothetical	   and	   that	   they	   had	   better	   take	   notice’	   (Walker	   2014:	   744).	   This	  tipping	  point	  for	  external	  socialisers,	  where	  ‘role-­‐actualisation’	  became	  possible,	  likely	  mobilised	  them	  to	  invest	  resources	  in	  pre-­‐socialisation	  efforts.	  	  	  When	  external	  actors	  did	  voice	  their	  opinions,	  they	  were	  largely	  negative.	  	  As	  Walker	   (2014:	  743-­‐744)	  noted:	   	   ‘The	  political	   reconfiguration	  of	   the	  UK,	   an	  erstwhile	  global	  power	  that	  still	  plays	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  shaping	  and	  upholding	  international	   institutions…and	   has	   an	   especially	   close	   relationship	   with	   the	  United	   States,	  would	   not	   be	   a	  minor	   event’	   (Walker	   2014).	   For	   some	   external	  actors,	   reactions	   to	   the	   referendum	   were	   simply	   about	   the	   short-­‐term	   effects	  Scottish	   independence	   would	   have	   on	   their	   interests.	   	   RyanAir,	   for	   example,	  commented	   that	   independence	   might	   be	   economically	   good	   for	   its	   airline	  (Bennett	  2014),	  and	   in	   India,	   the	   front	  page	  of	   the	  Hindustan	  Times	  warned	   its	  readers:	   ‘Great	   Scot!	   Independence	   vote	  may	   up	   Scotch	   prices’	   (Nelson	   2014).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  See,	  for	  example,	  What	  Scotland	  Thinks,	  at	  	  http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/should-­‐scotland-­‐be-­‐an-­‐independent-­‐country#line	  	  
	   14	  
But	   most	   of	   the	   international	   debate	   over	   Scottish	   independence,	   we	   argue,	  revolved	  around	  the	  nexus	  between	  sovereignty	  and	  roles.	  	  	  	  
Forecasting	  Scotland	  for	  a	  sovereign	  role	  The	   independence	   campaign	   was	   largely	   based	   on	   the	   value	   of	  sovereignty	  itself.	  	  With	  a	  sovereign	  role,	  Scots	  would	  be	  able	  to	  make	  their	  own	  choices,	   in	   both	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   policies.	   Although	   devolved	   Scotland	  already	  controlled	  many	  internal	  policies	  (e.g.,	  police,	  health	  care),	  the	  ‘Yes’	  side	  argued	   independence	  would	  offer	   additional	   scope	   for	  more	   social	   democratic,	  less	   market-­‐oriented	   political,	   economic,	   and	   social	   policies.	   Domestic	   policy	  promises	   included	   a	   ‘fairer’,	  more	   ‘socially	   just’,	   and	   ‘greener’	   country	   (Baxter	  n.d.;	   Mccarthy	   2014).	   As	   Scottish	   First	   Minister	   Salmond	   explained,	   ‘This	  referendum	  is	  about	  the	  future	  of	  Scotland,	  and	  the	  future	  of	  Scotland	  should	  be	  in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   people.	   We	   believe	   we	   can	   govern	   ourselves	   better	   than	  anyone	  else	  can’	  (C-­‐SPAN	  2014,	  1:25:03).	  The	  ‘Yes’	  side’s	  vision	  of	  sovereignty	  was	  very	  affirmative	  and	  functional.	  	  According	  to	  Bober,	   ‘the	  SNP	  in	  its	  discourse	  before	  and	  during	  the	  referendum	  campaign	  presented	  a	  consistently	  positive	  conceptualization	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  independence,	  as	  both	  concepts	  were	  associated	  with	  such	  signifiers	  as	  (among	  others):	   fairness,	   wealth,	   potential,	   vision,	   healthy,	   better,	   economic	  development,	   a	   stable	   economy	   or	   strong	   public	   services’	   (Bober	   2014:27).9	  Sovereignty	  was	  positive	  in	  that	  it	  would	  remove	  political	  obstacles	  to	  achieving	  these	  goals.	   	   In	  his	  visits	  to	  other	  countries	  and	  in	  editorials	   in	  The	  Washington	  
Post,	   First	   Minister	   Salmond	   (e.g.,	   2012)	   attempted	   to	   explain	   to	   external	  audiences,	   and	   reassure	   them	   these	   reasons	   behind	   the	   SNP’s	   bid	   for	  independence.	  The	   ‘No’	   side	   questioned	   the	   value	   of	   sovereignty	   in	   an	   interdependent	  world,	   particularly	   for	   small	   states,	   and	   emphasized	   risks,	   uncertainties,	   and	  threats	  associated	  with	  independence	  (Bober	  2014).	  	  As	  noted	  by	  Bober	  (2014)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The	  debate	  over	  Scottish	   independence	  also	  revealed	  different	  conceptions	  of	  internal	   dimensions	   of	   sovereignty	   between	   the	   pro-­‐independence	   side	   in	  Scotland	  and	  the	  anti-­‐independence	  side	  in	  England.	  	  The	  English	  understanding	  was	   ‘absolute’	   sovereignty,	   resting	   in	   parliament,	   whereas	   the	   Scottish	  conception	  was	  ‘popular’,	  residing	  with	  the	  people	  (Bober	  2014).	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former	  Prime	  Minister	  Gordon	  Brown,	  one	  key	  Scottish	  spokesperson	  for	  the	  ‘No’	  side,	   argued	   ‘only	   by	   pooling	   its	   resources	   with	   its	   British	   neighbours,	   can	  Scotland	   successfully	   cope	  with	   globalization.	   	   In	   an	   interdependent	  world	   [in	  Brown’s	   view]…Scottish	   sovereignty	   would	   signify	   an	   irresponsible	   marching	  against	   the	   tide	   and	  propose	   a	   19th	   century	   answer	   to	   21st	   century	   challenges’	  (Bober	  2014:	  30;	  Brown	  2014).	  	  The	  UK	  government	  also	  clearly	  worked	  hard	  to	  articulate	  the	  limited	  value	  of	  sovereignty.	  	  ‘The	   UK	   government…instructed	   each	   affected	   department	   in	  Whitehall	  to	  carry	  out	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  every	  kind	  that	  would	  fall	  on	  Scotland	  should	  it	  leave	  the	  Union.	  	  The	  result	  was	  the	  published	  series	  of	  ‘Scotland	  Analysis	  Papers’	  [including	  papers	  on	  EU	   and	   international	   issues,	   security,	   and	   defence].	   	   In	   addition,	  various	   select	   committees	   of	   the	   UK	   parliament	   issued	   their	   own	  reports,...emphasizing	   the	   costs	   to	   Scotland	   and	   denying	   or	  downplaying	   benefits	   that	   might	   accrue	   from	   independence.’	  (Walker	  2014:	  748).10	  	  The	  external	  community	  generally	  also	  projected	  a	  negative	  view	  of	  sovereignty	  for	   Scotland.	   In	   a	   statement	   released	   through	   the	   Better	   Together	   campaign,	  former	  U.S.	  President	  Bill	  Clinton	   ‘said	  he	  worried	  a	   ‘long,	   complex	  negotiating	  process’	  would	  weaken	  the	  Scottish	  economy	  and	  had	  concerns	  about	  Scotland	  trying	  to	  keep	  the	  pound	  as	  its	  currency’	  (Sanchez	  2014).	   	  The	  head	  of	  Shell	  Oil	  also	   publicly	   highlighted	   the	   risks	   and	   uncertainties	   of	   independence	   (Carrell	  2014).	  	  The	   ‘No’	   side	   and	   the	   UK	   government	   emphasised	   the	   dangers	   of	  sovereignty,	   thus	  questioning	   the	   value	  of	   a	   sovereign	   role	   given	   that	   Scotland	  would	  be	  a	  small	  state	  in	  a	  big	  world.	  There	  were	  efforts	  to	  highlight	  Scotland’s	  more	   limited	   capacity	   to	   exploit	   its	  North	   Sea	   oil	   resources	   than	  would	  be	   the	  case	   as	   part	   of	   ‘the	   broad	   shoulders	   of	   one	   of	   the	   top	   10	   economies	   in	   the	  world…’,	   clearly	  suggesting	  Scotland	  requires	   the	  UK’s	  comparative	  strength	   to	  effectively	  manage	  this	  economic	  resource	  (Castle	  and	  Reed	  2014).	  	  The	  ‘No’	  side	  forecasted	  an	   independent	  Scotland	   into	  a	  weak,	  small	  state	  role	   that,	  although	  sovereign,	  would	  have	  difficulty	  enacting	  roles	  consistent	  with	   its	   interests	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10 	  See,	   for	   example,	   House	   of	   Commons	   Foreign	   Affairs	   Committee	   (2013)	  
Foreign	   Policy	   Considerations	   for	   the	   UK	   and	   Scotland	   in	   the	   Event	   of	   Scotland	  
Becoming	  an	  Independent	  Country,	  Sixth	  Report	  of	  Session	  2012-­‐13,	  London.	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values.	   This	   view	   saw	   an	   independent	   Scotland	   finding	   itself	   highly	   and	  asymmetrically	  dependent	  on	  others	  for	  economics	  and	  security	  and	  vulnerable	  to	  instability	  in	  the	  global	  economy.	  The	   question	   of	   an	   independent	   Scotland’s	   currency	  was	   central	   to	   the	  campaigns	  and	  raised	  the	  relationship	  between	  economic	   interdependence	  and	  political	   independence.	   	   	   The	   Scottish	   government	   and	   the	   ‘Yes’	   side	   took	   the	  position	   that	   Scotland	   would	   be	   able	   to	   keep	   the	   pound.	   	   Contradicting	   this,	  George	  Osborne,	  UK	  Chancellor	   of	   the	  Exchequer,	   indicated	   there	  would	  be	  no	  chance	   of	   sharing	   the	   pound,	   with	   the	   other	   major	   UK	   political	   parties	  articulating	   the	   same	   position	   (Sparrow	   2014).	   Salmond	   attempted	   to	   counter	  Osborne’s	   position	   and	   accused	   the	   UK	   government	   of	   ‘bullying’	   (Hardman	  2014).	  	   	  Emphasising	  the	  reciprocal	  nature	  of	  interdependence	  and	  relying	  on	  a	  logic	   of	   rationality,	   the	   SNP	   repeatedly	   expressed	   the	   expectation	   that	   sharing	  the	  pound	  with	   an	   independent	   Scotland	  was	   in	   the	  UK’s	   interests,	   stating	   ‘it’s	  quite	  clear	  that	  not	  sharing	  a	  currency	  would	  cost	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  as	  much	  as	  it	  would	  cost	  Scotland’	  (Brittain	  2014).	  	  The	   sovereign	   role	   and	   the	   value	   of	   sovereignty	   was	   particularly	  prominent	   for	   some	  states	  where	  secessionist	  movements	  were	  active,	   such	  as	  Canada	   and	   Spain,	   who	   were	   concerned	   about	   Scottish	   independence	   as	  precedent.	   	   Indeed,	   the	  Spanish	  government	  was	  one	  of	   the	   first	   to	   react,	   soon	  after	   the	   Edinburgh	   Agreement	   in	   2011	   (Walker	   2014:	   746).	   Referring	   to	  separatist	  referendums,	  Spanish	  Prime	  Minister	  Rajoy	  said	   ‘everyone	  in	  Europe	  thinks	   that	   these	   processes	   are	   enormously	   negative	   because	   they	  worsen	   the	  economic	  recession	  and	  increase	  poverty	   for	  everyone’	  (quoted	   in	   Johnson	  and	  Waterfield	   2014).	   Other	   states	   with	   secessionist	   tensions	   offered	   similar	  characterizations.	  Canada’s	  Prime	  Minister	  Stephen	  Harper	  stated	  that	   it	  would	  not	   be	   in	   ‘global	   interests	   or	   frankly	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   people	   in	   those	  countries’	  for	  Scotland	  to	  become	  independent,	  and	  cited	  the	  ongoing	  challenges	  of	   globalisation	   and	   increased	   competition	   as	   problems	   that	   an	   independent	  Scotland	  could	  not	  solve	  alone’	  (The	  Scotsman	  2014).	  	  	  	  Foreign	   support	   for	   Scottish	   independence	   primarily	   came	   from	  independence	  movement	  leaders	  in	  other	  sub-­‐state	  territories,	  including	  Québec,	  Bavaria,	   and	   Catalonia	   (The	  Telegraph	   2014).	   Few	   states	   publicly	   supported	   a	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Scottish	  sovereign	  role.	   	  One	  exception	  was	  North	  Korea.	  An	  editorial	   from	  the	  government-­‐supported	  news	  agency	  stated:	  ‘I	  think	  that	  independence	  would	  be	  a	  very	  positive	  thing	  for	  Scotland.	  I	  believe	  that	  every	  person	  has	  the	  right	  to	  be	  a	  member	  of	   an	   independent	  nation,	   to	  have	   sovereignty,	   to	   live	   in	  peace	  and	   to	  enjoy	  equality’	  (The	  Telegraph	  2014).	  The	   ‘Yes’	   side	   countered	   the	   negative	   view	   of	   sovereignty,	   and	   the	  proposition	  that	  globalisation	  makes	  sovereignty	  almost	  irrelevant,	  especially	  for	  small	  states.	  	  Sturgeon	  argued	  that	  small	  states	  could	  ‘punch	  above	  their	  weight’	  and	  have	  influence	  disproportionate	  to	  their	  size	  (Sturgeon	  2013).	  	  The	  ‘Yes’	  side	  pointed	  out	  that	  most	  states	  in	  the	  world	  are	  small	  and	  that	  some	  play	  an	  active	  and	   leading	  role	   in	   international	  organisations.	   	   	  By	  prioritising	  their	  goals	  and	  concentrating	  their	  limited	  diplomatic	  resources,	  small	  states	  can	  carve	  out	  niche	  roles,	  champion	  specific	  issues,	  and	  broker	  agreements,	  as	  they	  often	  enjoy	  more	  credibility	  and	  neutrality	  than	  larger	  states	  because	  of	  their	  small	  size.	  The	  SNP	  often	  invoked	  (wealthy)	  Nordic	  examples	  as	  evidence	  of	  economically	  successful	  and	  influential	  small	  states,	  highlighting	  again	  the	  utility	  of	  a	  sovereign	  role	  (The	  Scottish	  Government	  2013).	  Overall,	  the	  SNP’s	  conception	  of	  a	  sovereign	  role	  was	  ‘clearly	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  even	  in	  an	  interdependent	  world,	  sovereignty	  involves	  internal	  as	  well	  as	  external	  possibilities	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  aims’	  (Bober	  2014:	  27;	  see	  also	   Adamson	   and	   Lynch	   2014).	   Jackson	   characterises	   the	   Scottish	   nationalist	  elite	   as	   having	   a	   very	   inclusive,	  modern	  understanding	  of	   sovereignty,	   quoting	  First	  Minister	  Salmond’s	  declaration:	   ‘I’m	  a	  post-­‐nationalist’	   (Jackson	  2014:54).	  	  Influenced	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  a	   ‘post-­‐sovereign	  state’,	   ‘the	  nationalists	  were	  able	  to	   present	   their	   case	   for	   an	   independent	   state	   not	   as	   an	   isolationist	   one,	   but	  instead	   as	   internationalist	   in	   essence.	   	   It	   was	   (and	   remains)	   a	   well-­‐argued	  attempt	   at	   the	   harmonious	   placing	   of	   self-­‐governing	   Scotland	   (internal	  sovereignty)	  in	  various	  international	  bodies,	  as	  cooperation	  is	  required	  because	  of	   globalization	   (external	   sovereignty)’	   (Bober	   2014:	   27).	   	   This	   view	   of	  sovereignty,	   as	   internationalist,	   begs	   the	   question:	   	   what	   substantive	   foreign	  policy	  roles	  would	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  play?	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The	  substantive	  foreign	  policy	  roles	  the	  ‘Yes’	  side	  forecasted	  for	  Scotland	  were	   intimately	   connected	   with	   the	   sovereign	   role	   (the	   second	   aspect	   of	   the	  sovereignty-­‐role	  nexus).	   	  This	  connection	  was	   in	  the	   form	  of	  a	  hypothetical	  –	   if	  Scotland	  were	   sovereign	   (a	   value	   in	   and	   of	   itself),	   then	   it	  would	   also	   play,	   for	  example,	   civilian	   power,	   EU,	   NATO,	   and	   international	   peacekeeper	   roles.	   The	  ‘white	  paper’	  Scotland’s	  Future	  (Scottish	  Government	  2013)	  established	  the	  ‘Yes’	  campaign’s	  vision	  of	  its	  foreign	  policy	  roles,	  which	  included	  both	  continuity	  and	  change.	  Continuity	  would	  be	  provided	  by	  on-­‐going	  membership	  in	  international	  organisations	  (e.g.,	  NATO	  and	  the	  EU)	  and	  a	  continued	  pro-­‐trade	  orientation	   in	  foreign	  economic	  policies.11	  But	  there	  would	  also	  be	  the	  possibility	  of	  change,	  as	  an	   independent	   Scotland	   could	   pursue	   values	   and	   interests	   somewhat	   distinct	  from	  those	  of	  the	  UK.	  	  	  The	  ‘Yes’	  campaign	  emphasised	  the	  ‘different	  international	  priorities’	  that	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  would	  pursue,	  seen	  ‘most	  clearly	  in	  matters	  of	  war	  and	  peace	  and	  in	  our	  relationship	  with	  the	  EU’	  (Scottish	  Government	  2013:209).	  	  The	  pledge	  to	  rid	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  –	  UK	  nuclear	  Trident	  submarines	  are	  the	  only	  UK	  nuclear	  force	  and	  are	  stationed	  in	  Scottish	  waters	  –	  was	   also	   grounded	   in	  principle,	   arguing	   ‘Trident	   is	   an	   affront	   to	  basic	   decency	  with	   its	   indiscriminate	   and	   inhumane	   destructive	   power’	   and	   ‘totally	   morally	  wrong’	   (Scottish	   Government	   2013:	   232;	   C-­‐SPAN	   2014	   1:07:43).	   The	   ‘Yes’	  campaign	   described	   an	   independent	   Scotland	   as	   a	   ‘champion	   for	   international	  justice	  and	  peace,’	  committed	  to	  the	  values	  of	  ‘international	  development,	  human	  rights,	   climate	   change,	   and	   climate	   justice’	   (Scottish	   Government	   2013:	   210,	  225).	  Scottish	  defence	   forces	  would	  be	  used,	   in	  addition	  to	  national	  defence,	   to	  support	   international	   peacekeeping	   and	   humanitarian	   missions	   undertaken	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  UN,	  NATO,	  and	  the	  EU	  and	  in	  support	  of	  international	  law.	  The	  vision	  was	   thus	  one	  of	  Scotland	  as	  a	  good	  global	  citizen	  with	  a	   ‘do	  no	  harm’	   principle,	   especially	   to	   developing	   countries,	   firmly	   embedded	   in	   its	  international	  role	  (Scottish	  Government	  2013:	  231).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  For	   convenience,	   this	   paper	   concentrates	   on	   the	   Scottish	   National	   Party’s	  leadership	   as	   the	   ‘Yes’	   side.	   	   Not	   all	   parts	   of	   the	   pro-­‐independence	  movement	  supported,	  for	  example,	  continued	  NATO	  membership.	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First	   Minister	   Salmond	   (2012)	   authored	   opinion	   editorials	   in	   The	  
Washington	   Post	   and	   used	   his	   visits	   to	   other	   countries	   to	   forecast	   an	  independent	   Scotland’s	   role.	   In	   one	   speech,	   for	   example,	   Salmond	   reassured	  outside	   actors	   that	   Scotland	  would	  be	   international,	   a	   supporter	  of	  democratic	  and	   cosmopolitan	   values,	   and	   would	   follow	   liberal,	   open	   economic	   policies	  (Walker	  2014:750).	  Far	  from	  rejecting	  the	  most	  important	  prevailing	  norms	  and	  practices,	   the	   independence	   side	   emphasized	   that	   Scotland	   would	   continue	   to	  embrace	  them.	  Opponents,	   both	   internal	   and	   external,	   to	   Scottish	   interdependence	  highlighted	   uncertainty	   about	   the	   substantive	   foreign	   policy	   roles	   an	  independent	   Scotland	   could	   play.	   NATO,	   for	   example,	   indicated	   that	   Scotland	  would	   have	   to	   apply	   as	   a	   new	   state	   and	   that	   membership	   would	   require	  unanimous	  agreement	  of	  all	  twenty-­‐eight	  alliance	  members	  (Carrell	  2013).	  	  The	  UK	  Foreign	  and	  Commonwealth	  Office	  stated	  that	  an	  ‘independent	  Scottish	  state	  would	  have	  to	  start	  afresh	  in	  terms	  of	   its	   formal	  alliances,	  and	  links	  with	  every	  other	   sovereign	   state’	   (cited	   in	   Walker	   2014:	   749).12	  	   	   The	   UK	   government	  published	   its	   own	   legal	   advice,	   stating	   that	   Scotland	   would	   immediately	   be	  outside	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  UN	  (The	  Guardian,	  2013).	  Sovereignty	  would	  not	  open	  the	  door	  to	  new	  substantive	  roles,	  but	  instead	  foreclose	  them.	  The	  ability	  of	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  to	  play	  an	  EU	  role	  was	  a	  key	  point	  of	  contention.	  	  The	  UK	  government	  consistently	  argued	  that	  Scotland	  would	  face	  serious	   obstacles	   to	   EU	   entry.	   For	   example,	   David	   Lidington,	   UK	   Minister	   for	  Europe,	  stated	  that	  ‘I’ve	  been	  sat	  around	  the	  EU	  table	  for	  the	  last	  three	  years	  for	  many	   discussions	   about	   EU	   enlargement.	   	   It	   is	   the	   complexity,	   the	   time-­‐consuming	   nature	   of	   those	   negotiations,	   that	   the	   people	   of	   Scotland	   ought	   to	  bear	  in	  mind.	  	  It	  isn’t	  straightforward.’	  (Liddington	  2014).	  	  	  EU	  actors	  and	  other	  member-­‐states	  also	  quickly	  cast	  doubt	  on	  automaticity	  of	  membership,	  thereby	  questioning	  Scotland’s	  ability	  to	  define	  for	  itself	  a	  post-­‐independence	  EU	  role.	  In	  December	   2012,	   the	   EU	   Commission	   President	   declared	   that	   any	   new	   state	  would	  have	  to	  apply	  for	  EU	  membership,	  contra	  the	  Scottish	  government’s	  claim	  that	   it	   would	   be	   able	   to	   renegotiate	   its	   membership	   from	   inside	   the	   EU	   (BBC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12 	  From	   Scotland	   Analysis:	   	   EU	   and	   International	   Issues,	   Cm	   8765	   (London:	  	  Foreign	  and	  Commonwealth	  Office,	  2014),	  5.	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News	   2012b).	   Spain	   also	   used	   EU	   membership	   to	   cast	   uncertainty	   on	   an	  independent	  Scotland’s	  role.	  	  On	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  vote,	  the	  Spanish	  Foreign	  Minister	  reiterated	   Spain’s	   opinion	   that	   EU	   membership	   would	   not	   be	   automatic	   and	  would	  require	  unanimous	  support	   from	  EU	  member	  states	  (Roberts	  2014).	   ‘An	  independent	  Scotland	  would	  be	   forced	  to	  wait	  at	   least	   five	  years	  to	   join	  the	  EU	  and	  would	   then	  have	   to	  sign	  up	   to	   the	  euro,	   the	  Spanish	  government…warned’	  (Johnson	  2014).	  Forecasting	  against	  a	  Scottish	  EU	  role	  was	  not	  uniform,	  however.	  Graham	  Avery,	   the	   European	   Commission’s	   honorary	   director	   general	   advised	   Scottish	  voters	  to	  dismiss	  the	  ‘perplexing’	  and	  ‘absurd’	  tactics	  suggesting	  Scotland	  would	  face	   a	   challenging	   process	   in	   acquiring	   EU	   membership.	   	   In	   response	   to	  assertions	   from	   the	   Presidents	   of	   the	   European	   Council	   and	   the	   European	  Commission	   that	   EU	   treaties	   would	   not	   apply	   to	   newly	   independent	   parts	   of	  current	  member	  states,	  Avery	  described	  this	  as	  ‘not	  the	  whole	  truth’	  (BBC	  News	  2014a).	  Other	  EU	  states	  also	  weighed	  in,	  with	  Czech	  president	  Vaclav	  Klaus	  and	  senior	   French	   senator	   specializing	   in	   foreign	   policy	   Joelle	   Garriaud-­‐Maylam	  challenging	   EU	   leaders’	   positions,	   and	   stating	   that	   such	   threats	   from	   the	   UK	  government	   ‘are	  not	   credible’	  and	   that	  an	   independent	  Scotland	   ‘would	  stay	   in	  the	  European	  Union’	  (Herald	  Scotland	  2014).	  The	  ‘Yes’	  side	  noted	  that	  EU,	  as	  well	  as	   NATO	   and	   UN,	   membership	   were	   to	   be	   expected	   since	   it	   was	   in	   others’	  interest	   to	   have	   an	   independent	   Scotland	   in	   these	   arenas	   of	   international	  cooperation	  (e.g.,	  Scottish	  Government	  2014).	  	  	  
Role	  implications	  for	  others	  	  	   Pre-­‐socialisation	  during	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  referendum	  also	  centred	  on	  the	  effects	  Scottish	  independence	  would	  have	  on	  the	  UK’s	  role	  is	  the	  world,	  and	  the	  consequences	  for	  Europe	  and	  for	  global	  politics.	  	  These	  efforts	  illustrate	  the	  third	  aspect	  of	   the	   sovereignty-­‐role	  nexus	  –	   the	   interconnectedness	  of	   a	  new	  actor’s	  sovereignty	  with	  others’	  roles	  and	  the	  international	  system	  of	  roles.	  	  	  On	   the	   eve	   of	   the	   referendum	   vote,	   Spain’s	   Foreign	   Minister	   García-­‐Margallo	  warned	  that	  the	  UK	  ‘would	  be	  damaged,	  its	  political-­‐economic	  prestige	  undermined	   in	   the	  world,	  and	   the	  EU	  needs	   the	  UK’	   (quoted	   in	  Roberts	  2014).	  Italian	  Prime	  Minister	  Enrico	  Letta	  cautioned:	  	  ‘The	  UK	  is	  one	  of	  the	  pillars	  of	  the	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single	   market,	   of	   big	   international	   trade	   agreements	   and	   is	   so	   important	   in	  Europe	   that	   the	  consequence	  will	  be	  maybe	   the	  start	  of	   the	   true	  decline	  of	   the	  European	   Union.	   The	   sequence,	   the	   consequences	   of	   tomorrow's	   referendum,	  could	  be	  very,	   very	  dangerous’	   (quoted	   in	  The	  Telegraph	  2014).	   	  Germany	  was	  also	  against	  a	  divided	  UK.	   	  Germany’s	  Foreign	  Minister	  Steinmeier	  observed,	   ‘A	  German	   foreign	   minister	   is	   well	   advised	   not	   to	   interfere	   in	   British	   domestic	  politics.	  But	   I	  would	  openly	  admit	   that	   I	  would	  rather	  see	  Great	  Britain	  remain	  together’	  (quoted	  in	  The	  Telegraph	  2014).	  Interestingly,	  discussion	  of	  Scotland’s	  potential	  role	  as	  an	  independent	  contributing	  EU	  member	  was	  foregone	  entirely.	  	  	  Outside	   the	   government,	   but	   a	   key	   German	   actor	   nonetheless,	   one	  Deutsche	   Bank	   Chief	   economist	   warned:	   ‘A	   'Yes'	   vote	   for	   Scottish	  independence…would	  go	  down	  in	  history	  as	  a	  political	  and	  economic	  mistake	  as	  large	   as	  Winston	   Churchill's	   decision	   in	   1925	   to	   return	   the	   pound	   to	   the	   Gold	  Standard	  or	   the	   failure	  of	   the	  Federal	  Reserve	   to	  provide	   sufficient	   liquidity	   to	  the	  US	  banking	  system,	  which	  we	  now	  know	  brought	  on	  the	  Great	  Depression	  in	  the	  US’	   (quoted	   in	  The	  Telegraph	  2014).	   	  Former	  Swedish	  Prime	  Minister	  Bildt	  also	   suggested	   that	   a	   ‘Yes’	   vote	   could	   destabilise	   the	   UK	   and	   undermine	   the	  Northern	  Ireland	  peace	  process	  (The	  Scotsman	  2014).	  	  Ireland	  expressed	  similar	  concerns,	  which	   according	   to	  Walker	   (2014),	   involved	   its	   proximity	   to	   the	   UK	  and	   the	   possible	   negative	   implications	   for	   the	   stability	   of	   peace	   in	   Northern	  Ireland.	  The	  U.S.	   opposition	   to	   a	   sovereign	   role	   for	   Scotland	  was	   also	   intimately	  connected	   to	   the	   consequences	   for	   the	   UK’s	   role.	   	   In	   addition	   to	   a	   general	  concern	  about	   the	  precedent	   separation	   could	   set	   for	  other	   regions	  and	   states,	  the	  U.S.	  worried	  about	  the	  weakening	  of	  the	  UK	  as	  an	  ally	  and	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  the	  UK’s	  contribution	  to	  nuclear	  deterrence.	  	  These	  concerns	  were	  voiced	  in	  U.S.-­‐based	  elite	  opinion	  pages	  (King	  2012;	  The	  Washington	  Post	  2012;	  The	  New	  York	  
Times,	  2013)	  and	  early	  on	  in	  the	  debate,	  Hillary	  Clinton	  also	  said	  she	  would	  ‘hate’	  to	  see	  Britain	  ‘lose’	  Scotland	  (Sanchez,	  2014;	  see	  also	  Walker	  2014:	  746;	  Brooks	  and	  Carrell	  2014).	  	  The	  U.S.	  government,	  like	  others,	  initially	  adopted	  the	  official	  position	  that	  the	  referendum	  was	  strictly	  an	  internal	  UK	  affair.	  Yet	  ‘within	  the	  US	  government,	   there	   was	   concern	   that	   its	   most	   dependable	   and	   influential	   ally	  would	   be	   diminished	   by	   Scotland’s	   departure.	   	   In	   addition,	   the	   UK	   and	   by	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extension	  NATO	  might	  be	  weakened	  if	  the	  referendum	  resulted	  in	  a	  reduction	  of	  military	  capabilities	  –	   including	  nuclear	  capabilities—and	  greater	  reluctance	   to	  deploy	  military	  forces	  abroad’	  (Walker	  2014:747).	  As	  the	  referendum	  vote	  drew	  near,	  the	  U.S.	  official	  position	  was	  indicated	  at	   the	  highest	   level,	  by	  the	  president.	   	   In	   June	  2014,	  Obama	  stated	  that	   the	  U.S.	  preferred	   that	   the	   UK	   remained	   ‘strong,	   robust,	   united,	   and	   effective’,	  presumably	   at	   the	   urging	   of	   Prime	   Minister	   Cameron	   (quoted	   in	   Brooks	   and	  Carrell	  2014;	  see	  also	  Walker	  2014).	  Obama	  remarked	  that	  the	  UK	  appeared	  to	  have	   ‘worked	   pretty	   well’	   (quoted	   in	   The	   Scotsman	   2014),	   but	   acknowledged	  that	  the	  decision	  was	  ‘up	  to	  the	  people	  of	  Scotland’	  (quoted	  in	  Brooks	  and	  Carrell	  2014).	  The	  State	  Department	  reiterated	  the	  US	  preference	  against	  independence	  just	  days	  before	  the	  election	  (Sherwell,	  2014).	  Finally,	  ‘President	  Barack	  Obama	  made	   an	   11th-­‐hour	   appeal	   for	   Scots	   to	   vote	   no…..The	   unusual	   last-­‐minute	  intervention	  by	   the	  President	  was	  a	   sign	  of	   concern	   in	  Washington	   that	  one	  of	  America's	   closest	   allies	   could	   be	   about	   to	   split	   in	   two.	   “The	   UK	   is	   an	  extraordinary	  partner	   for	  America	  and	  a	   force	   for	  good	   in	  an	  unstable	  world.	   I	  hope	  it	  remains	  strong,	  robust	  and	  united,”	  Mr	  Obama	  said	  in	  a	  tweet’	  (Sanchez,	  2014).	  	  	  The	   implications	   for	   nuclear	   deterrence	   also	   worried	   the	   French	  government.	   	   	   According	   to	   Walker	   (2014:	   747),	   France	   was	   less	   concerned	  about	  consequences	  for	  the	  EU:	  ‘For	  France,	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  UK’s	  Trident	  nuclear	  force	  was	  a	  singular	  worry….	   [France]	  viewed	   the	  Scottish	  ambition	   to	  deprive	  the	  UK	  of	  its	  nuclear	  bases	  at	  Faslane	  and	  Coulport,	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  plausible	  alternatives	   in	   England	   and	  Wales,	   as	   seriously	   discomforting.	   	   There	   was	   no	  desire	  in	  Paris	  for	  France	  to	  become	  Europe’s	  only	  nuclear-­‐armed	  state.’	  Without	  the	  UK	  to	  play	  the	  role	  of	  a	  nuclear	  power,	  France’s	  nuclear	  role	  would	  become	  more	   salient	   than	   the	   French	   public	   might	   be	   willing	   to	   accept.	   	   The	   French	  government	  also	  worried	  about	  the	  consequences	  for	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council.	  	  A	  diminished	  UK	  with	  a	  Security	  Council	  veto	  might	  strengthen	  arguments	  of	  other	  states	  seeking	  permanent	  seats	  (Walker	  2014).	  	  Other	   states	   also	   weighed	   in	   on	   the	   implications	   for	   the	   UK	   and	   for	  international	  relations.	  Chinese	  Premier	  Li	  Keqiang	  focused	  on	  the	  consequences	  for	  the	  UK:	  	  ‘Speaking	  at	  a	  joint	  press	  conference	  with	  [UK	  Prime	  Minister]	  David	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Cameron,	  Li	  Keqiang	  said	  he	  wanted	  a	  ‘strong,	  prosperous’	  Britain	  and	  a	  ‘united	  United	   Kingdom’	   when	   asked	   about	   the	   referendum’	   (Riley-­‐Smith,	   2014).	  Australian	   Prime	   Minister	   Tony	   Abbott	   claimed	   that	   the	   world	   ’would	   not	   be	  helped’	   by	   Scottish	   independence	   (The	   Scotsman	   2014),	   stating:	   ‘I	   am	   a	   firm	  friend	  of	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	   I	  want	   it	   to	   remain	   the	  United	  Kingdom,	  not	  the	  disunited	  Kingdom.	   It	   is	  a	  matter	   for	  Scotland,	  obviously,	  but	  as	  a	   friend	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  that	  is	  my	  view’	  (The	  Telegraph	  2014).	  	  Concern	   about	   threats	   to	   the	   European	   project	   of	   integration	   and	   a	  fragmentation	   of	   the	   international	   system	  were	   evident	   in	   others’	   reactions	   to	  the	  Scottish	  referendum.	   	  Spain’s	  Foreign	  Minister	  García-­‐Margallo	  warned	  that	  secession	  ‘would	  end	  up	  in	  a	  Balkanisation	  process	  that	  nobody	  in	  Europe	  wants	  right	  now’	  (quoted	  in	  Roberts	  2014)	  and	  Spanish	  Prime	  Minister	  Rajoy	  called	  the	  referendum	   ‘a	   torpedo	   to	   the	   waterline	   of	   European	   integration’,	   saying	   that	  ‘Europe	   came	   together	   to	   join	   states	   together,	   not	   to	   break	   them	   apart.’	  Independence	  would	   be	   ‘bad	   for	   the	   region,	   bad	   for	   the	   state	   and	   bad	   for	   the	  EU….there	  would	  be	  very	  little	  support	  for	  any	  such	  moves’	  (quoted	  in	  Johnson	  and	   Waterfield	   2014).	   	   	   Former	   Swedish	   Prime	   Minister	   Bildt	   warned	   of	   a	  ‘Balkanisation’	  of	   the	  British	   Isles	   (The	  Scotsman	  2014).	   	  Former	  U.S.	  President	  Bill	   Clinton	   and	   former	   U.S.	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Madeleine	   Albright	   expressed	  concern	  over	  the	  dangers	  of	  European	  secessionist	  movements	  (Sanchez	  2014).	  	  Pope	  Francis	  said	  that	  ‘all	  division’	  worried	  him	  (Riley-­‐Smith	  2014).	  The	   ‘Yes’	   side’s	   response	   to	   these	  warnings	   involved,	   in	  part,	   calling	  out	  hypocrisy.	   	   In	   reaction	   to	   Australian	   Prime	   Minister’s	   anti-­‐independence	  remarks,	   for	   example,	   First	   Minister	   Salmond	   described	   the	   comments	   as	  ‘bewildering’	   (The	   Scotsman	   2014)	   and	   replied	   that	   independence	   ‘does	   not	  seem	  to	  have	  done	  Australia	  any	  harm’	  (Pearlman	  2014).	  The	  SNP	  leader	  made	  similar	  comparisons	  to	  U.S.	  and	  Irish	  independence	  from	  Britain	  and	  invoked	  the	  international	  principle	  of	  self-­‐determination	  (Salmond	  2012).	   	   	  Such	  comments	  reflected	  again	  the	  value	  of	  a	  sovereign	  role	  itself.	  	  
The	  end	  game?:	  	  role	  rejection	  The	  polls	  were	  close	  until	  the	  end.	  Surveys	  indicated	  a	  surge	  for	  the	  ‘Yes’	  vote	  in	  August	  2014,	  and	  some	  polls	  put	  ‘Yes’	  in	  the	  lead	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	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the	   Edinburgh	   Agreement	  was	   concluded.	   Ultimately,	   however	   the	   outcome	   of	  the	  bid	   for	  sovereignty	  was	  definitive	  and	  unsuccessful	   (What	  Scotland	  Thinks,	  2014).	   On	   18	   September	   2014,	   Scottish	   residents	   turned	   out	   to	   vote	   (an	  unusually	   high	   84.6%)	   on	   the	   question,	   ‘Should	   Scotland	   be	   an	   independent	  country?’	  and	  a	  majority	  answered	  ‘No’,	  with	  55.3%	  voting	  against	  independence	  (BBC	  News	  2014b).	  	  	  Scotland	  would	  not	  have	  a	  sovereign	  role	  in	  the	  world.	  It	   is	   difficult	   to	   know	   if	   the	   international	   pre-­‐socialisation	   efforts	  made	  any	  difference	  to	  voters’	  choices.	  	  Carrell	  (2014),	  for	  example,	  claims	  that	  the	  US	  position	   probably	   made	   no	   difference.	   Foreign	   and	   security	   policy	   were	   not	  major	  factors,	  according	  to	  public	  opinion	  surveys.	  	  Uncertainty,	  and	  particularly	  uncertainty	  over	  economic	  issues,	  were,	  however,	  extremely	  important	  and	  were	  connected	  to	  international	  socialisation	  efforts	  on,	  for	  example,	  EU	  membership	  (Bell,	  Delaney,	  and	  McGoldrick	  2014).	  Abroad,	  the	  referendum	  was	  broadly	  met	  with	   a	   collective	   sigh	   of	   relief,	   and	   the	   reaction	   amongst	   concerned	   European	  actors	  was	  uniformly	  positive.	  	  José	  Manuel	  Barroso	  (President	  of	  the	  European	  Commission),	  Anders	  Fogh	  Rasmussen	  (Secretary	  General	  of	  NATO),	  and	  various	  other	   European	   leaders	   praised	   the	   referendum’s	   outcome	   (Macdonald	   and	  Taylor	  2014).	  German	  Chancellor	  Angela	  Merkel	  was	  comparatively	  circumspect:	  ‘I	  will	  not	  comment	  on	  this	  but	  just	  smile’	  (Macdonald	  and	  Taylor	  2014).	  It	   is	  worth	  noting	  here	   that	   the	   independence	  debate	  could	  have	   looked	  dramatically	   different	   than	   it	   did,	   with	   perhaps	   a	   greater	   focus	   on	   identity	  distinctions,	  nationalism,	  and	  acrimonious	  recrimination	  about	   the	  past.	   	  While	  these	  aspects	  were	  present	   to	  some	  extent,	  a	   remarkable	  amount	  of	  effort	  was	  focused	  squarely	  on	  what	  roles	  Scotland	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK	  could	  and	  could	  not	  play.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  framed	  debates	  about	  material	  conditions	  and	  capabilities,	  alliance	  potential,	  and	  economic	  uncertainties.	  The	   question	   of	   independence,	   however,	   did	   not	   end	   with	   the	   2014	  referendum.	  	  A	  surge	  in	  SNP	  membership	  unexpectedly	  followed	  the	  vote,	  and	  in	  the	  May	  2015	  UK	  national	  elections,	  Scotland	  elected	  SNP	  candidates	  for	  56	  of	  its	  59	  national	   parliamentary	   seats.	   	  Moreover,	   in	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	  of	   the	  Brexit	  vote	  in	  June	  2016,	  the	  Scottish	  First	  Minister	  Nicola	  Sturgeon	  stated	  that	  Brexit	  was	  a	  significant	  change	   in	  Scottish-­‐UK	  circumstances	  and	  that	  a	  second	  independence	   referendum	  vote	  was	   therefore	  highly	   likely	   (BBC	  News	  2016b).	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Whether	  another	  referendum	  would	  occur	  depends	   in	  part	  on	   internal	  Scottish	  and	  internal	  UK	  politics,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  UK	  exit	  negotiations	  with	  the	  EU	  and	   the	  position	   that	  key	   international	  actors	   take	   regarding	  Scotland’s	  desire	   to	   remain	   within	   the	   EU.	   	   From	   a	   role	   theoretic	   perspective,	   the	   UK	  abandoned	  its	  EU	  role	  and	  thus	  calculations	  of	  the	  uncertainties	  associated	  with	  a	   sovereign	   Scottish	   role	  might	   change	   for	  many	   of	   those	  who	   argued	   against	  independence	  in	  2014.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  pre-­‐socialisation	  arguments	  regarding	  harm	  to	  European	  integration	  and	  unity	  may	  have	  much	  less	  punch	  given	  the	  UK’s	  exit.	  In	   any	   event,	   any	   future	   bid	   for	   sovereignty	   by	   Scotland	   would	   undoubtedly	  trigger	  another	  round	  of	  pre-­‐socialisation,	  but	  this	  would	  come	  in	  a	  new	  context	  in	  which	  the	  UK’s	  role	  had	  dramatically	  changed.	  	  
Conclusions	  Socialisation	   is	   an	   important	   concept	   in	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   international	  relations	  theories	  because	  it	  tells	  us	  something	  about	  the	  maintenance	  and	  order	  of	   the	   international	   society	   of	   sovereign	   states.	   Defining	   socialisation	   as	   an	  interactive	  process	  that	  is	  broader	  than	  norm	  internalization	  provides	  a	  way	  of	  examining	   what	   the	   current	   international	   system	   means	   to	   the	   agents	  themselves	  –	  what	  roles	  are	  possible,	  what	  roles	  are	  appropriate,	  and	  what	  roles	  are	  desired.	  Socialisation	  involves	  the	  mechanisms	  for	  maintaining	  the	  society’s	  system	   of	   roles,	   and	   pre-­‐socialisation	   extends	   this	   to	   the	   maintenance	   and	  definition	   of	   the	   sovereign	   system.	   Drawing	   on	   our	   investigation	   into	  international	   reactions	   to	   the	   Scottish	   independence	   referendum,	   we	   consider	  here	   the	   broader	   implications	   for	   role	   theory	   and	   state	   socialisation	   and	   the	  generalizability	  of	  insights	  from	  the	  Scottish	  case.	  	  Similar	   to	   the	   socialisation	   processes	   of	   novice	   states	   noted	   by	   Thies	  (2013),	  international	  actors	  frequently	  sought	  to	  limit	  Scotland’s	  ability	  to	  define	  its	   new	   role,	   and	   highlighted	   the	   small	   and	   uncertain	   nature	   an	   independent	  Scotland	  would	   have.	   	   Yet	   several	   aspects	   of	   pre-­‐socialisation	   seen	   in	   the	   case	  differ	   from	   the	   socialisation	   of	   a	   novice	   state	   and	  have	   significant	   implications	  for	   our	   theoretical	   understanding	   of	   role	   socialisation.	   	   The	   pre-­‐socialisation	  period	   places	   sovereignty	  more	   centrally	   in	   the	   process	   and	   reveals	   the	   nexus	  between	   sovereignty	   and	   roles.	   	   Whether	   an	   actor	   could	   become	   a	   sovereign	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state	   is	   intimately	   bound	   up	  with	  what	   role	   that	   state	  might	   take;	   these	  were	  virtually	   simultaneous	   within	   the	   Scottish	   case.	   	   The	   three	   aspects	   of	   the	  sovereignty-­‐role	   nexus	   provide	   insights	   into	   state	   socialisation	   and	   how	  sovereignty	  relates	  to	  roles.	  	  We	  demonstrated	  that	  sovereignty	  itself	  is	  a	  role	  to	  be	  cast	  and	   that	   symbolic	   interactionism,	   contra	  a	   structural-­‐functionalist	  view	  of	  sovereignty	  as	  a	  status,	  highlights	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  sovereignty.	   	  We	  also	   argued	   that	   how	   sovereignty	   is	   constructed	   helps	   shape	   the	   substantive	  roles	  available	  to	  states.	  	  Pre-­‐socialisation	   also	   exposes	   the	  meaning	   of	   sovereignty	   –	   how	   actors	  see	  its	  value,	  its	  content,	  its	  purpose.	  	  Philpott’s	  (2001)	  arguments	  regarding	  the	  transformation	  of	  sovereignty	  by	  the	  EU	  can	  clearly	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  Scottish	  case,	  as	   can	   the	   more	   general	   debate	   over	   what	   independence	   means	   in	   an	  interdependent	  world,	   particularly	   for	   small	   states	   (Hassan	  and	  Mitchell	   2013;	  Keating	   and	   Harvey	   2014).	   	   Although	   the	   ‘Yes’	   side	   was	   a	   nationalist	  independence	   movement	   and	   sovereignty	   was	   a	   value	   in	   and	   of	   itself,	   this	  independence	   movement	   hoped	   to	   retain	   pooled	   sovereignty	   within	   the	   EU.	  	  According	   to	   Bobor,	   visions	   of	   sovereignty	   in	   the	   ‘Yes’	   campaign	   ‘were	   never	  isolationist…,	  as	  the	  awareness	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  international	  cooperation	  was	  often	  mentioned’	  (Bober	  2014:31).	  This	  led	  some	  on	  the	  ‘No’	  side	  to	  question	  the	  value	  of	   sovereignty,	  given	   the	  multi-­‐level	  governance	  system	  of	  contemporary	  Europe.	   	  Somewhat	   ironically,	  Scotland	  sought	  autonomy	  but	  preferred	   to	  pool	  its	   sovereignty	  with	   the	   EU,	   while	   the	   UK	   opposed	   Scottish	   independence	   but	  preferred	   autonomy	   from	   the	   pooled	   EU	   sovereignty	   through	   its	   Brexit	  referendum.	  	  	  Consistent	   with	   an	   English	   School	   perspective,	   the	   guardians	   of	   the	  international	  society,	  primarily	  the	  powerful	  states,	  acted	  to	  preserve	  the	  status	  quo.	   	   Contrary	   to	   other	   instances	   of	   guardians	   controlling	   the	   expansion	   of	  international	   society	   through	   a	   ‘standard	   of	   civilization’	   and	   socialising	  revolutionary	   or	   ‘rogue’	   states	   (e.g.,	   Armstrong	   1993;	   Bull	   and	   Watson	   1984;	  Gong	   1984),	   the	   response	   to	   Scotland	   in	   part	   rested	   on	   the	   notion	   that	   there	  would	   perhaps	   be	   too	   many	   sovereign	   states	   should	   Scotland	   achieve	  independence.	   This	   along	   with	   concerns	   about	   precedents	   for	   ‘Balkanisation’	  reflects	  member-­‐states’	  understanding	  of	  sovereignty:	  	  too	  much	  of	  a	  good	  thing	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may	   itself	   be	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   current	   society	   and	   international	   order.	   	   The	  international	   community	   seemed	   to	   be	   conveying	   the	   message,	   to	   paraphrase	  Lenin’s	   views	   on	   liberty:	   	   ‘sovereignty	   is	   precious,	   so	   precious	   that	   it	  must	   be	  rationed.’	  	  Pre-­‐socialisation	   also	   reveals	   the	   connected	   nature	   of	   roles	   and	   the	  implications	  of	  a	  new	  sovereign	  state	   for	  others’	   roles.	   	   	   Since	  Scotland	  was	  an	  aspirant	  state,	  its	  agency	  as	  a	  sovereign	  actor	  became	  entangled	  with	  the	  agency	  of	   the	   UK	   and	   its	   role	   in	   the	   international	   system.	   	   Much	   of	   the	   forecasting	  expressed	  by	  EU	  members,	  as	  well	  as	  NATO	  members,	  had	  less	  to	  do	  with	  how	  Scotland	  would	  enact	   its	   role	  post-­‐independence	  and	  more	   to	  do	  with	  how	  the	  UK	   would	   be	   compromised	   in	   its	   ability	   to	   maintain	   its	   role	   in	   international	  politics.	  This	  duality	  of	   role	  pre-­‐socialisation	   for	  Scotland	  and	   role	  anticipation	  for	   the	   rest	  of	   the	  UK	   reinforces	   the	  broader	  argument	  within	   role	   theory	   that	  roles	  are	  fundamentally	  interdependent,	  defined	  and	  redefined	  by	  the	  society	  of	  states	   within	   which	   they	   exist.	   	   This	   duality	   continued	   after	   the	   2016	   Brexit	  referendum	  as	   the	  question	  of	  a	  sovereign	  role	   for	  Scotland	  was	  once	  again	  on	  the	  table	  due	  to	  a	  dramatic	  shift	  in	  the	  UK’s	  European	  role.	  The	   Scottish	   independence	   case	   is	   clearly	   distinct	   from	   other	  independence	   movements	   in	   important	   ways.	   	   It	   came	   at	   a	   time	   of	   peace,	  prosperity,	   and	   stability,	   led	   by	   a	   left-­‐of-­‐centre	   party	   seeking	   interdependence	  rather	   than	   by	   a	   right-­‐wing	   isolationist	  movement.	  Moreover	   Scotland	   already	  enjoyed	   significant	   autonomy	   through	   devolution,	   and	   the	   entire	   bid	   for	  sovereignty	  was	  itself	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  UK	  home	  state.	  	  The	  democratic	  nature	  of	   the	   referendum	   itself	   gave	   the	  process	   legitimacy	   in	   the	  eyes	  of	  most	  of	   the	  international	  community.	  This	  meant	  that	  when	  external	  actors	  did	  intervene,	  it	  was	   done	   primarily	   through	   the	   role	   contestation	   process	   (Cantir	   and	   Kaarbo	  2016)	  within	  the	  referendum	  campaigns.	  	  The	  international	  community	  was	  not	  trying	   to	  persuade	   Scotland’s	   government	   or	  political	   leaders,	   as	   is	   the	   case	   in	  most	   research	   on	   socialisation,	   but	   instead	   the	   target	   of	   socialisation	   was	   the	  Scottish	  voting	  public.	  	  Although	   there	   are	   many	   cases	   of	   independence	   movements	   and	   even	  independence	  referenda	  (Coggins	  2011;	  Mendez	  and	  Germann	  2016),	  few	  share	  all	  of	  these	  characteristics.	  	  Within	  the	  European	  Union,	  Catalonia	  and	  Veneto	  are	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examples	  of	  other	   sub-­‐state	   territories	   that	  have	  held	   independence	  referenda,	  but	   these	  have	  not	  been	   sanctioned	  by	   the	  home	   state	   (respectively	   Spain	   and	  Italy).	  	  Outside	  the	  EU,	  there	  have	  been	  recent	  independence	  referenda	  in	  Puerto	  Rico,	  Québec,	  East	  Timor,	  South	  Sudan,	  South	  Ossetia,	  and	  Montenegro,	  with	  only	  some	  of	  these	  with	  home	  state	  approval.	  	  Other	  secessionist	  movements,	  such	  as	  in	  Palestine,	  Chechnya,	  Aceh,	  and	  Tibet,	  have	  not	  had	  referenda	  but	  groups	  there	  still	   bid	   for	   a	   sovereign	   role.	   Each	   of	   these	   cases	   of	   attempted	   secession	   has	  unique	  characteristics	  and	  contexts	  that	  undoubtedly	  influence	  the	  international	  community’s	  pre-­‐socialisation	  efforts.	  	  	  We	  expect,	  however,	   that	   the	  general	  arguments	  we	  have	  made	  here	  do	  apply	  to	  other	  cases.	  	  When	  other	  secessionist	  movements	  vie	  for	  independence	  (Eritrea,	  Kosovo,	  Somaliland,	  or	  South	  Sudan),	  they	  are	  seeking	  a	  sovereign	  role	  that	  must	   be	   negotiated	   and	   constituted	   by	   other	   actors.	   	   Others’	   reactions	   to	  secession	  will	   be	   influenced	  by	   the	  meaning	  of	   sovereignty	   at	   that	   time	  and	   in	  that	   context.13	  Other	   cases	   of	   secession	   (e.g.,	   Catalonia,	   Kurdistan,	  Montenegro,	  Québec,	   South	   Sudan)	   also	   involve	   forecasting	   substantive	   foreign	  policy	   roles,	  particularly	  given	  the	  consequences	  for	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  home	  state	  and	  the	  roles	  of	   others	   (Darmanovic	   2003;	  McHugh	  2015;	   Vela	   and	  Xifra	   2015;	   Voller	   2015,	  2016).	   	   	   These	   cases,	  we	   argue,	   illustrate	   our	   broadest	   point	   that	   socialisation	  begins	   before	   statehood.	   Using	   role	   theory	   to	   understand	   pre-­‐socialisation	  emphasises	  the	  common	  features	  that	  independence	  movements	  must	  navigate;	  they	  must	  strive	  for	  sovereignty	  as	  it	  is	  defined	  by	  existing	  actors,	  and	  the	  force	  of	  their	  argument	  for	  independence	  will	  be	  conditioned	  by	  available	  roles.	  The	   Scottish	   case	   is	   valuable	   for	   understanding	   the	   sovereignty-­‐role	  nexus	  precisely	  because	  it	  strips	  away	  many	  other	  complicating	  factors	  that	  are	  operative	   in	   other	   cases.	   	   There	  was	   no	   question	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	   violence	  with	   or	   without	   independence,	   an	   independent	   Scotland	   would	   not	   be	   anti-­‐normative,	  the	  right	  of	  self-­‐determination	  and	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  referendum	  were	  not	  in	  question.	  	  Still,	  the	  international	  community	  was	  largely	  opposed	  and	  actively	   ‘intervened’	  to	  influence	  the	  referendum	  vote,	  socialising	  Scotland	  with	  regard	   to	   its	   forecasted	   sovereign	   and	   foreign	   policy	   roles.	   While	   other	   cases	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  On	  South	  Sudan,	  for	  example,	  see	  Christopher	  (2011);	  on	  small	  island	  independence	  movements,	  see	  Baldacchino	  and	  Hepburn	  (2012).	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introduce	   more	   complex	   layers	   of	   conflict,	   legitimacy,	   and	   norms,	   we	   would	  expect	   the	  sovereignty-­‐role	  nexus	   to	  be	  a	  central	   feature.	   	   In	  other	  words,	  pre-­‐socialisation	  of	  other	  actors	  seeking	  sovereignty	  would	  involve	  questions	  of	  what	  international	  roles	  they	  could	  play	  and	  the	  effects	  on	  the	  system	  of	  roles	  on	  the	  world	  stage.	  Although	   we	   have	   made	   the	   case	   that	   pre-­‐socialisation	   has	   distinct	  features	  that	  reveal	  the	  nexus	  between	  sovereignty	  and	  roles,	  we	  expect	  some	  of	  these	   to	  be	  present	   in	  other	   forms	  of	   state	   socialisation.	   	   Intriguingly,	   the	  UK’s	  2016	   referendum	   to	   leave	   the	   EU	   created	   a	   somewhat	   parallel	   instance	   of	  socialisation.	  Even	   though	   the	  UK	  was	   already	   sovereign,	   the	   ‘Leave’	   campaign	  arguments	  centred	  on	  a	  ‘more’	  sovereign	  role,	  equating	  an	  EU	  role	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  sovereignty.	  	  Many	  arguments	  for	  and	  against	  Brexit	  echoed	  the	  themes	  of	  the	  Scottish	   independence	   debate	   on	   the	   value	   and	   meaning	   of	   sovereignty.	   In	  addition,	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  connection	  between	  a	  more	  independent	  role	  and	  the	  substantive	  foreign	  policy	  roles	  that	  the	  UK	  could	  play.	  Finally,	  the	  international	  community’s	   reaction	   to	   Brexit	   and	   independence	   from	   the	   EU	  were	   similarly	  connected	  to	  the	  roles	  forecasted	  for	  other	  actors	  –	  could	  the	  EU	  continue	  to	  play	  its	   ‘Global	   Power’	   role	   without	   the	   UK?	   	   Would	   the	   United	   States’	   role	   in	   the	  ‘special	  relationship’	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  UK	  change	  after	  Brexit?	  	  The	  UK	  and	  Brexit	  is	  just	  one	  example	  of	  how	  the	  sovereignty-­‐role	  nexus	  operates	  in	  other	  instances	  of	  socialisation.	  	  The	  Scottish	  case	  of	  pre-­‐socialisation,	  distinct	  as	  it	  is,	  allowed	  us	  to	  focus	  on	  these	  theoretical	  aspects	  of	  socialisation	  that	  should	  be	  explored	  in	  future	  research.	  The	  birth	  of	  a	   state	  has	  many	  midwives.	   	  A	  crowded	   international	   stage	  may	   perhaps	   have	   had	   room	   for	   one	   more	   actor,	   but	   such	   theatre	   is	   not	  improvisational.	   Instead,	   Scotland’s	   bid	   for	   independence	   roused	   a	   host	   of	  concerned	  stakeholders	  who	  defended	  their	  interests	  and	  sought	  to	  influence	  the	  referendum	  outcome	  and	  effectively	  position	  themselves,	  and	  Scotland’s	  role,	  in	  international	   society	   if	   independence	   was	   achieved.	   	   This	   was	   an	   interactive	  process,	   involving	   pro-­‐independence	   Scottish	   actors	   and	   external	   actors	  forecasting	  potential	  roles	  for	  a	  new	  state.	  In	  the	  end,	  Scotland	  did	  not	  manage	  to	  be	  cast	  into	  a	  new	  sovereign	  role.	  To	  quote	  Lady	  Macbeth	  ‘what’s	  done	  is	  done’,	  but	   the	   post-­‐Brexit	   European	   theatre	   may	   have	   given	   this	   ‘Scottish	   play’	   one	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more	   act,	   changing	   the	   cast	   of	   characters	   and	   opening	   the	   possibility	   of	   new	  dialogue	  to	  follow.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Acknowledgements	  We	  are	  grateful	  for	  comments	  on	  earlier	  manuscript	  drafts	  from	  Cristian	  Cantir,	  Alexandra	   Remond,	   Yaniv	   Voller,	   the	   IR	   Research	   Group	   at	   the	   University	   of	  Edinburgh,	   participants	   at	   the	   Independence	   in	   an	   Interdependent	   and	  Multicultural	   World	   workshop	   at	   St	   Andrews,	   and	   anonymous	   reviewers.	   We	  owe	  special	  thanks	  to	  Hannah	  Solomon-­‐Strauss	  for	  her	  research	  assistance.	  
	  
	  
References	  	  Adamson,	  K.	  and	  P.	  Lynch	  (eds)	  (2014)	  Scottish	  Political	  Parties	  and	  the	  2014	  
Independence	  Referendum.	  	  Cardiff:	  	  Welsh	  Academic	  Press.	  Aggestam,	  L.	  (2006)	  Role	  Theory	  and	  European	  Foreign	  Policy:	  A	  Framework	  for	  Analysis.	  	  	  In	  O.	  Elgstrom	  and	  M.	  Smith	  (eds)	  The	  European	  Union’s	  Roles	  in	  
International	  Politics:	  Concepts	  and	  Analysis.	  London:	  Routledge,	  11-­‐29.	  Alderson,	  K.	  (2001)	  Making	  Sense	  of	  State	  Socialization.	  Review	  of	  International	  
Studies	  27(3)	  415-­‐33.	  Armstrong,	  D.	  (1993)	  Revolution	  and	  World	  Order:	  	  The	  Revolutionary	  State	  in	  
International	  Society	  (Oxford:	  	  Clarendon	  Press).	  BBC	  News,	  (2012a)	  SNP	  members	  vote	  to	  ditch	  the	  party's	  anti-­‐Nato	  policy.	  	  19	  October	  .	  BBC	  News	  (2012b)	  Scottish	  independence:	  EC's	  Barroso	  says	  new	  states	  need	  'apply	  to	  join	  EU’.	  10	  December.	  BBC	  News	  (2014a).	  	  Scottish	  independence:	  Scotland	  could	  join	  EU	  in	  18	  months,	  says	  expert.	  	  30	  January.	  BBC	  News.	  (2014b)	  How	  Scotland’s	  ‘No’	  vote	  resonates	  around	  the	  world.	  	  19	  September.	  	  BBC	  News	  (2016a)	  EU	  Referendum:	  	  The	  results	  in	  maps	  and	  charts.	  	  24	  June.	  	  Available	  at:	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-­‐politics-­‐36616028	  (accessed	  18	  July	  2016).	  BBC	  News	  (2016b)	  Brexit:	  	  Nicola	  Sturgeon	  says	  second	  Scottish	  independence	  vote	  ‘highly	  likely.’	  24	  June.	  Barnett,	  M.	  (1993)	  Institutions,	  Roles,	  and	  Disorder:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  Arab	  States	  System.	  International	  Studies	  Quarterly	  37(3):	  271-­‐296.	  Baxter,	  S.	  (n.d.)	  A	  Fair	  And	  Caring	  Scotland	  For	  All.	  	  Yes	  Scotland.	  Web.	  Accessed	  1	  Nov	  2014.	  <http://www.yesscotland.net/reasons/fair-­‐and-­‐caring-­‐scotland-­‐all>	  Beasley,	  R.,	  J.	  Kaarbo,	  &	  H.	  Solomon-­‐Strauss.	  (2016).	  To	  Be	  or	  Not	  To	  Be	  a	  State:	  Role	  Contestation	  in	  the	  Debate	  over	  Scottish	  Independence.	  In:	  Cantir	  C.	  and	  Kaarbo,	  J.	  (eds)	  Domestic	  Role	  Contestation,	  Foreign	  Policy,	  and	  
International	  Relations.	  Routledge	  Publishers.	  	  
	   31	  
Bell,	  D.N.F.,	  L.	  Delaney,	  and	  M.	  McGoldrick	  (2014)	  Citizen	  Preferences	  for	  Constitutional	  Change	  in	  Scotland,	  	  University	  of	  Stirling	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  the	  UK	  and	  Scotland	  Report,	  May.	  	  Beneš,	  V.	  and	  S.	  Harnisch	  (2015)	  Role	  theory	  in	  Symbolic	  Interactionism:	  	  Czech	  Republic,	  Germany,	  and	  the	  EU.	  	  Cooperation	  and	  Conflict	  50(1):	  146-­‐165.	  Bennett,	  A.	  (2014)	  Ryanair's	  Michael	  O'Leary	  Backs	  Scottish	  Independence	  Due	  To	  Air	  Passenger	  Duty	  Cut.	  	  The	  Huffington	  Post	  UK.	  28	  February.	  Biersteker,	  T.J.	  and	  C.	  Weber	  (eds.)	  (1996)	  State	  Sovereignty	  as	  Social	  Construct.	  Cambridge:	  	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Bober,	  S.	  (2014)	  The	  Concept(s)	  of	  Sovereignty	  in	  the	  Scottish	  Independence	  Debate.	  Horizons	  of	  Politics	  5(13):	  11-­‐39.	  Breuning,	  M.	  (2011)	  Role	  Theory	  Research	  in	  International	  Relations:	  State	  of	  the	  Art	  and	  Blind	  Spots.	  In:	  Harnisch	  S,	  Frank	  C	  and	  Maull	  HW	  (eds)	  Role	  
Theory	  in	  International	  Relations:	  Approaches	  and	  Analyses.	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  16-­‐35.	  	  Brittain,	  A.	  (2014)	  U.K.	  currency	  debate	  heats	  up.	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  16	  March.	  Brooks,	  L.	  and	  S.	  Carrell	  (2014)	  Obama’s	  Scottish	  Independence	  Intervention	  Gets	  Cautious	  Reaction.	  	  The	  Guardian	  7	  June	  2014.	  Brown,	  Gordon	  (2014)	  My	  Scotland,	  Our	  Britain:	  	  A	  Future	  Worth	  Sharing.	  London:	  Simon	  &	  Schuster.	  Buck,	   T.	   and	   M.	   Dickie	   (2014)	   Spain	   Promises	   Non-­‐Interference	   on	   Scotland.	  	  
Financial	  Times,	  2	  February.	  Bull,	   H.	   (1977)	   The	  Anarchical	   Society:	   A	   Study	   of	  Order	   in	  World	   Politics.	   New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  C-­‐SPAN	  (2014)	  Scottish	  Independence	  Debate.	  	  25	  August.	  Web.	  Accessed	  7	  July	  2015.	   <http://www.c-­‐span.org/video/?321045-­‐1/scottish-­‐independence-­‐debate>	  Cantir,	   C.	   (2011)	   The	   Allied	   Punishment	   and	   Attempted	   Socialisation	   of	   the	  Bolsheviks	   (1917-­‐1924):	   	   An	   English	   School	   Approach.	   Review	   of	  
International	  Studies	  37(4):1967-­‐1994.	  Cantir	  C.	  and	  Kaarbo	  J.	  (eds)	  (2016)	  Domestic	  Role	  Contestation,	  Foreign	  Policy,	  
and	  International	  Relations.	  London:	  Routledge.	  Carrell,	  S.	  (2013)	  Nato	  Rejects	  Alex	  Salmond	  Claim	  Over	  Scottish	  Membership.	  
The	  Guardian	  10	  April.	  Carrell,	  S.	  (2014)	  Shell	  Boss	  Warns	  against	  Scottish	  Independence.	  	  The	  Guardian.	  6	  March.	  Castle,	  S.	  and	  S.	  Reed	  (2014)	  Scottish	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  anIssue	  in	  Vote	  on	  Independence.	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  24	  February.	  Checkel,	  J.T.	  (2005)	  International	  Institutions	  and	  Socialization	  in	  Europe:	  	  Introduction	  and	  Framework.	  	  International	  Organization	  59(4):	  801-­‐26.	  Christopher,	  A.J.	  (2011)	  Secession	  and	  South	  Sudan:	  	  An	  African	  precedent	  for	  the	  future?	  South	  African	  Geographical	  Journal	  93(2):125-­‐132.	  Coggins,	  B.	  (2011)	  Friends	  in	  High	  Places:	  	  International	  Politics	  and	  the	  Emergence	  of	  States	  from	  Secessionism.	  	  International	  Organization	  65:	  433-­‐467.	  Darmanovic,	  S.	  (2003)	  Montenegro:	  	  The	  Dilemmas	  of	  a	  Small	  Republic.	  	  Journal	  
of	  Democracy	  14(1):145-­‐153.	  
	   32	  
Duchêne,	  F.	  (1972)	  ‘Europe’s	  role	  in	  world	  peace’,	  in	  R.	  Mayne	  (ed.),	  Europe	  
Tomorrow,	  London:	  Fontana,	  pp.	  32-­‐47.	  Flockhart,	  T.	  (2004)	  ‘Masters	  and	  Novices’:	  Socialization	  and	  Social	  Learning	  in	  NATO-­‐Parliamentary	  Assembly,	  International	  Relations	  18(3):	  361–80.	  Ford,	  M.	  (2014)	  ‘UK	  to	  Russia:	  	  Crimea	  Isn’t	  Scotland,’	  The	  Atlantic,	  17	  March.	  The	  Guardian,	  (2013)	  “David	  Cameron	  tries	  to	  put	  the	  brakes	  on	  Alex	  Salmond”,	  11	  February.	  Hardman,	  I.	  (2014)	  Salmond	  attacks	  credibility	  of	  ‘No’	  campaign	  threats.	  	  In:	  Coffee	  House	  blog,	  The	  Spectator	  24	  February.	  Harnisch,	  S.	  (2011)	  Role	  Theory:	  Operationalization	  of	  Key	  Concepts.	  	  In:	  Harnisch,	  S.,	  C.	  Frank,	  and	  H.W.	  Maull	  (eds)	  Role	  Theory	  in	  International	  
Relations:	  Approaches	  and	  Analyses,	  London:	  Routledge.	  Harnisch	  ,	  S.	  (2016)	  	  Role	  Theory	  and	  the	  Study	  of	  Chinese	  Foreign	  Policy.	  	  In:	  Harnisch,	  S.,	  S,	  Bersick,	  and	  J-­‐C.	  Gottwald	  (eds)	  China’s	  International	  Roles.	  	  London:	  Routledge.	  Harnisch,	  S.,	  S.	  Bersick,	  and	  J-­‐C.	  Gottwald	  (eds)	  (2016)	  China’s	  International	  Roles.	  	  London:	  Routledge	  Harnisch,	  S.,	  C	  Frank	  and	  H.W.	  Maull	  (eds)	  (2011)	  Role	  Theory	  in	  International	  
Relations.	  London:	  Routledge.	  Hassan,	   G.	   and	   J.	   Mitchell	   (eds.)	   After	   Independence	   Edinburgh:	   Luath	   Press	  Limited.	  
Herald	  Scotland	  (2014)	  “Independence	  Would	  Not	  Bar	  Scotland	  From	  EU	  Membership.”	  1	  March.	  	  Holsti,	   K.J.	   (1970)	   National	   Role	   Conceptions	   in	   the	   Study	   of	   Foreign	   Policy,	  	  
International	  Studies	  Quarterly	  14:	  233-­‐309.	  Jackson,	  B.	  (2014)	  The	  Political	  Thought	  of	  Scottish	  Nationalism,	  Political	  Studies	  47(3):50-­‐56.	  Jackson,	   R.	   (2000)	  The	  Global	  Covenant:	  Human	  Conduct	   in	   the	  World	  of	   States.	  	  Oxford:	  	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Johnson,	   S.	   (2014)	   Spanish	   warn	   independent	   Scotland	   would	   get	   euro	   not	  pound,	  The	  Telegraph	  16	  September	  2014.	  Johnson,	  S.	  and	  B.	  Waterfield	  (2014)	  	  Spanish	  Prime	  Minister	  gives	  EU	  warning	  to	  Scots.	  	  The	  Telegraph	  17	  September.	  Johnston,	   A.I.	   (2005)	   Conclusions	   and	   Extensions:	   	   Toward	   Mid-­‐Range	  Theorizing	  and	  Beyond	  Europe,	  	  International	  Organization	  59:1013-­‐1044.	  	  Keating,	  M.	  and	  M.	  Harvey	  (2014)	  Small	  Nations	  in	  a	  Big	  World:	  	  What	  Scotland	  
Can	  Learn?	  	  Edinburgh:	  Luath	  Press	  Limited.	  King,	  C.	  (2012)	  The	  Scottish	  Play:	  Edinburgh’s	  Quest	  for	  Independence	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  Separatism,	  	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  September/October.	  Liddington,	  D.	  (2014)	  Press	  release:	  	  Prospects	  of	  EU	  membership	  for	  a	  newly	  independent	  Scotland.	  Foreign	  and	  Commonwealth	  Office,	  UK	  Government,	  16	  January.	  MacAskill,	   E.,	   J.	   Kaiman,	   and	   J.	   Burke	   (2013)	   Obama	  Administration	   Reiterates	  Belief	  UK	  Is	  Stronger	  Within	  EU,	  	  The	  Guardian	  23	  January.	  MacDonald,	   Alastair	   and	   Paul	   Taylor	   (2014)	   EU	   Relief	   of	   Scotland’s	   ‘No’	   vote	  Tinged	  with	  Fear	  of	  Nationalism,	  	  Reuters	  New	  Agency.	  Manners,	   I.	   (2002)	   ‘Normative	   Power	   Europe:	   A	   Contradiction	   in	   Terms?’,	  
Journal	  of	  Common	  Market	  Studies	  40(2):	  235-­‐258.	  
	   33	  
Maull,	  H.W.	  (1990)	  Germany	  and	  Japan:	  The	  New	  Civilian	  Powers.	  Foreign	  Affairs	  69(5):	  91-­‐106.	  McCarthy,	   M.	   (2014)	   If	   Scotland	   Votes	   Yes,	   What	   Could	   It	   Mean	   For	   Fishing,	  Farming	  And	  Wildlife?	  	  The	  Independent.	  8	  September.	  	  McCourt,	  D.M.	  (2012)	  The	  Roles	  States	  Play:	  A	  Meadian	  Interactionist	  Approach,	  	  
Journal	  of	  International	  Relations	  and	  Development	  13(3):	  370-­‐392.	  	  McHugh,	   J.T.	   (2015)	   Paradiplomacy,	   Protodiplomacy	   and	   the	   Foreign	   Policy	  Aspirations	   of	   Quebec	   and	   Other	   Canadian	   Provinces.	   	   Canadian	   Foreign	  
Policy	  Journal	  21(3):	  238-­‐256.	  Nelson,	   D.	   (2014)	   Indians	   fear	   Scottish	   independence	   could	   raise	   Scotch	   price.	  	  
The	  Telegraph	  17	  September.	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	   (2013)	  A	  Vote	  on	  Scottish	   Independence,	   	   (Editorial),	  27	  March.	  Pearlman,	  J.	  (2014)	  Australians	  divided	  over	  Scottish	  referendum	  	  The	  Telegraph	  16	  September.	  Riley-­‐Smith,	  B.	   (2014)	  Scottish	   independence:	  China's	  premier	   says	  he	  wants	  a	  'united	  United	  Kingdom'.	  	  The	  Telegraph	  18	  June.	  Roberts,	  M.	   (2014)	  Spain	   says	  Scottish	   independence	  would	  be	  a	   'catastrophe’.	  
The	  Telegraph,	  17	  September.	  Saideman,	   S.M.	   (1997)	   Explaining	   the	   International	   Relations	   of	   Secessionist	  Conflict:	  	  Vulnerability	  vs.	  Ethinic	  Ties,	  	  International	  Organization	  51:721-­‐753	  Salmond,	  A.	  (2012)	  Scotland	  Should	  be	  Independent,	  	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  7	  December.	  Sanchez,	  R.	  (2014)	  Barack	  Obama	  tells	  Scotland:	  stay	  united	  	  The	  Telegraph,	  17	  September.	  Schimmelfennig,	  F.	  (2000)	  International	  Socialization	  in	  the	  New	  Europe:	  	  Rational	  Action	  in	  an	  Institutional	  Environment.	  	  European	  Journal	  of	  
International	  Relations	  6:	  109-­‐139.	  
The	  Scotsman,	  Scottish	  Independence:	  	  Global	  Reaction,	  16	  September	  2014.	  Scottish	  Government	  (2013)	  Scotland’s	  Future:	  	  Your	  Guide	  to	  an	  Independent	  
Scotland.	  	  Edinburgh.	  Sherwell,	  P.	  (2014)	  White	  House	  calls	  for	  Britain	  to	  remain	  a	  'united'	  partner.	  	  
The	  Telegraph	  15	  September.	  Sparrow,	  A.	  (2014)	  George	  Osborne’s	  speech	  on	  Scottish	  Indpendence.	  	  In:	  Politics	  live	  blog.	  The	  Guardian	  13	  February.	  Stryker	  and	  Stratham	  (1985)	  Symbolic	  Interactionism	  and	  Role	  Theory.	  In:	  G.	  Lindsey	  and	  E.	  Aronson	  (eds)	  Handbook	  of	  Social	  Psychology,	  Vol.1	  (New	  York:	  	  Random	  House).	  Sturgeon,	  N.	  (2013)	  Evidence	  to	  UK	  House	  of	  Commons	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Committee,	  28	  January;	  http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/643/130128.htm,	  accessed	  17	  May	  2015.	  
The	  Telegraph,	   (2014)	  Scottish	   independence:	   How	   the	   world	   has	   reacted	   	   18	  September.	  Thies,	  C.G.	  2003.	  Sense	  and	  Sensibility	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  State	  Socialization:	  A	  Reply	  to	  Kai	  Alderson.	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies	  29(4):	  543-­‐550.	  
	   34	  
Thies,	  C.G.	  (2010a)	  	  Role	  Theory	  and	  Foreign	  Policy,.	  In:	  R.A.	  Denemark	  (Ed.)	  The	  
International	  Studies	  Encyclopedia,	  (Oxford:	  	  Blackwell);	  Blackwell	  Reference	  Online.	  	  Thies,	  C.G.	  (2010b)	  	  State	  Socialization	  and	  Structural	  Realism,	  	  Security	  Studies	  19(4):	  689-­‐717.	  Thies,	  C.G.	  (2012)	  International	  Socialization	  Processes	  vs.	  Israeli	  National	  Role	  Conceptions:	  	  Can	  Role	  Theory	  Integrate	  IR	  Theory	  and	  Foreign	  Policy	  Analysis?	  	  Foreign	  Policy	  Analysis	  8:25-­‐46.	  Thies,	  C.G.	  (2013)	  The	  United	  States,	  Israel,	  and	  the	  Search	  for	  International	  Order:	  	  
Socializing	  States.	  	  London:	  Routledge.	  	  Thies,	  C.G.	  (2016)	  The	  US	  and	  China:	  	  Altercast	  Roles	  and	  Changing	  Power	  in	  the	  20th	  Century.	  In:	  Harnisch,	  S.,	  S,	  Bersick,	  and	  J-­‐C.	  Gottwald	  (eds)	  China’s	  
International	  Roles.	  	  London:	  Routledge.	  Vela,	  J.D.S.E,	  and	  J.	  Xifra	  (2015)	  International	  Representation	  Strategies	  for	  Stateless	  Nations:	  	  The	  Case	  of	  Catalonia’s	  Cultural	  Diplomacy.	  Place	  
Branding	  and	  Public	  Diplomacy	  11(1):83-­‐96.	  Voller,	  Y.	  (2015)	  Contested	  Sovereignty	  as	  an	  Opportunity:	  	  Understanding	  Democratic	  Transitions	  in	  Unrecognized	  States.	  Democratization	  22(4):610-­‐630.	  Voller,	  Y.	  (2015)	  The	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  and	  the	  South	  Sudan	  Question:	  	  Reconsidering	  Moderation.	  International	  Affairs	  92(3):665-­‐682.	  What	  Scotland	  Thinks	  (2014)	  Should	  Scotland	  be	  an	  independent	  country?.	  	  Available	  at:	  http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/should-­‐scotland-­‐be-­‐an-­‐independent-­‐country#line	  Walker,	  S.G.	  	  (1987).	  Role	  Theory	  and	  Foreign	  Policy	  Analysis.	  Durham,	  N.C.:	  Duke	  University	  Press.	  Walker,	  S.G.	  (1992)	  	  Symbolic	  Interactionism	  and	  International	  Politics:	  Role	  Theory’s	  Contribution	  to	  International	  Organization.	  	  In:	  Contending	  
Dramas:	  a	  Cognitive	  Approach	  to	  International	  Organizations,	  edited	  by	  Martha	  Cottam	  and	  Chih-­‐yu	  Shih,	  19-­‐38.	  New	  York:	  Praeger.	  	  Walker,	  W.	  (2014)	  International	  Reactions	  to	  the	  Scottish	  Referendum,	  	  
International	  Affairs	  90(4):743-­‐759.	  Waltz,	  K.N.	  	  (1979)	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics.	  	  New	  York:	  	  McGraw-­‐Hill.	  
The	  Washington	   Post	   (2012)	   	   Scottish	   Independence	   Vote	   is	   Part	   of	  Worrying	  Trend,	  	  (Editorial)	  31	  October.	  Wehner,	   L.E.	   (2014)	   Role	   Expectations	   As	   Foreign	   Policy:	   South	   American	  Secondary	   Powers'	   Expectations	   of	   Brazil	   As	   A	   Regional	   Power.	   Foreign	  
Policy	  Analysis,	  doi:	  10.1111/fpa.12048	  Wehner,	  L.E.	  and	  C.G.	  Thies	  (2014)	  	  Role	  Theory,	  Narratives,	  and	  Interpretation:	  The	   Domestic	   Contestation	   of	   Roles,	   	   International	   Studies	   Review	  16(3):411-­‐436.	  	  Wendt,	  A.	  (1992)	  Anarchy	  is	  What	  States	  Make	  of	  It:	  	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Power	  Politics,	  	  International	  Organization	  46:391-­‐425.	  Wentworth,	   W.M.	   (1980)	   Context	   and	   Understanding:	   	   An	   Inquiry	   Into	  
Socialization	  Theory	  (NY:	  	  Elsevier).	  Wight,	   M.	   (1977)	   International	   Legitimacy.	   	   In	   H.	   Bull	   (ed.)	   Systems	   of	   States.	  	  Leicester:	  Leicester	  University	  Press.	  Wish,	   N.B.	   (1980)	   Foreign	   Policy	   Makers	   and	   National	   Role	   Conceptions,	  	  
International	  Studies	  Quarterly	  24(4):532-­‐54.	  
	   35	  
	  	  
